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Labour market, income formation 




The paper presents the labour market module, the income formation module and the 
social security and tax module o f  the dynamic cross-sectional microsimulation model 
NED YMAS.  With this model it is possible to simulate (future) social security benefits 
and contributions. Comparison with the actual figures shows that the model 
reconstructs the socioeconomic development in the field o f  wage income and social 
security benefits and contributions very well. 
Keywords: Microsimulation; Income; Social security 
In a previous article (Nelissen [119]) we described the 
household and education module of the microsimu- 
lation model NEDYMAS. 1 NEDYMAS is a dynamic 
cross-sectional microsimulation model, which has 
been developed to analyse the lifetime redistributive 
impact of Dutch social security schemes. It is a 
comprehensive model for the Dutch household sector, 
consisting of three main modules: a demographic 
module, a labour market and income formation 
module, and a social security module. 
This article gives a description of the labour market 
and income formation module and the social security 
module in NEDYMAS. We start with a short overview 
of the development of microsimulation models. Then 
we give an overall overview of NEDYMAS. Next a 
description of the two modules will be given, followed 
by some simulation results with these modules. 
A short history of the development of 
microsimulation models 
In the 1960s and early 1970s a number of purely 
demographic oriented microsimulation models were 
developed. Hyrenius and others developed a repro- 
The author is with Tilburg University, Room P-2.210, PO 
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duction model at the University of Gothenburg. 2 
Their model has a demographic-physiological frame- 
work. The well known POPSIM model was con- 
structed at the University of North Carolina and was 
used for the evaluation of family planning campaigns.3 
At the University of Toronto,  Howell and Lehotay 
[71] constructed a microsimulation model for explor- 
ing small human populations, AMBUSH. Emphasis 
was on kinship ties and similar kinds of connectivity 
within small communities. Other contributions are 
from Ridley and Sheps [130] - who developed 
REPSIM to study the effects of demographic and 
biological effects on natality - from Barrett [6], from 
Foster and Yost [39] - focusing on population and 
rural development - from Dyke and McCluer [31] 
and from Crafts and Ireland [24]. Most of these 
models had only academic applications and seem to 
have disappeared (Hellwig [64], p 5). 
Microsimulators which also contain socioeconomic 
variables were implemented in particular in the 1970s. 
The first application of dynamic microsimulation in a 
socioeconomic context dates from 1961 (Orcutt et al 
t The NEtherlands' DYnamic Micro-_Analytic Simulation model. 
In the m~ean time, the~-demographic module has been extended by 
the modelling of institutional households. For a description, see 
Nelissen [121-1. 
2See Hyrenius and Adolfsen [731, Hyrenius [121] et al [74], 
Hyrenius and Holmberg [75] and Holmberg [68,69]. 
3 See Horvitz et al [70] and Shah [135]. 
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[127]). This application, however, was rather limited. 
It was primarily developed to prove that this kind of 
model was possible. It was limited to population 
simulations. The model was a dynamic one, but 
modelling was too rough for real applications. A first 
real proof  of the applicability was given by Orcutt  et 
al [125], almost twenty years after the introduction 
of the concept. Data  and hardware limitations were 
important  problems. 
A second large microsimulation project started in 
1972 in West Germany (see Krupp [79]): the SPES 
project and its successor, the Sfb3 project. In this case, 
the first important  result was published in 1981 
(Krupp et al [80]). Both projects refer only to the 
household sector. This holds for almost all micro- 
simulation models; the most important  exception is 
the MOSES project in Sweden (eg Eliasson [32]). 
During the last fifteen years more and more - often 
partial microsimulation models were developed. 
Especially during the Carter administration, micro- 
simulation models were applied to analyse the distri- 
butional and financial effects of changes in state 
programmes in the USA (see Heike [56,57]). An 
overview of microsimulation models can be found in 
Geurts [45], Orcutt  et  al [125], Krupp  and Wagner 
[81], Fallows [34], Smith [136], Haveman ([51] 
Chapter  11), Merz [86] and Hellwig [64, 65]. 
The first applied (static) microsimulation model was 
TAX, developed at the Treasury Depar tment  (see 
Pechman [128]) and applied from 1963. This model 
led to a number  of more complex models in the USA 
and Canada. 4 Microsimulation became the 'dominant  
quantitative technique for forecasting the impacts of 
policy changes in the social welfare policy area '  
(Fallows [34], p2)  from about 1969 in the USA. Its 
start was given by the development in 1969 of the 
RIM model. 5 RIM was also a static model. It was 
aimed especially at calculating eligibility for public 
assistance programmes (see Wilensky [153] and 
McClung [82]). RIM was developed under great time 
pressure at the President's Commission on Income 
Maintenance Program. The dissolution of this Com- 
mission led to the transfer of many researchers in the 
field of microsimulation among them Nelson 
McClung, Gail Wilensky and Robert Harris from 
the federal government to the Urban Institute. This 
institute has played a major  role in the further 
development of microsimulation since then (1970). At 
the Urban Institute, RIM - which was too costly to 
run, very difficult to modify and which contained 
programming errors as a consequence of continual 
'*See Okner [124], Pechman et al [129] and Bossons [15]. 
5 Reforms in Income Maintenance. 
reprogramming - was significantly revised. This 
resulted in a new static microsimulation model, called 
TRIM.  6 TRIM had to be more efficient and flexible 
than RIM, which resulted in very complicated soft- 
ware. As a consequence, modifications were difficult 
to programme and flexibility was lost. The system was 
therefore redesigned later on. 7 TRIM has been used 
in many projects and is still in operation. 
Two key individuals in developing TRIM,  Jodie 
Allen and Harold Beebout, left the Urban Institute 
after some problems and went to Mathematica Policy 
Research. There they developed a second generation 
model of TRIM,  called MATH. s This model was still 
in use in the 1980s. See Beebout [8] for the evaluation 
of two of the Reagan administration social programme 
changes: reductions in federal income support to low 
income families (the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act) and a proposal for a private individual alternative 
to institutional retirement schemes (Incentives for 
Private Household Retirement Savings). On the basis 
of TRIM and MATH,  Betson et  al [11] built the KGB 
model within one month. The KGB model has been 
used to analyse various versions of the Program for 
Better Jobs and Income, and to evaluate negative 
income tax, credit income tax and wage subsidy 
plans. 9 A special model to explore the use of energy 
was developed from TRIM:  CHRD.  1° STATS is also 
based on TRIM.  STATS (see Wertheimer et  al [150], 
p 9) was especially used for the simulation of the use 
of welfare programmes. Other models from the Urban 
Institute are the UI  (Unemployment  Insurance) model 
to analyse unemployment insurance and the NHI  
(National Health Insurance) model.11 
Independently of the foregoing models, the OTA 
model was developed in order to simulate personal 
income taxes. 12 Thousands of proposals for tax 
changes have been simulated with this model! A 
summary of behavioural simulation methods in tax 
policy analysis can be found in Feldstein [38]. 
All these models are static and do not have a link 
to the national economy. To tackle the last problem, 
Golladay and Haveman [46] and Haveman et al [53] 
added a consumption function, an input-output  
model for the production sector and a model for the 
income distribution to a version based on the TAX 
6TRansfer Income Model: see McClung et al [83], Beebout and 
Bonina [7] and Sulvetta [143]. 
TThis resulted in TRIM2: see Webb et al 1-149]. 
s MicroAnalysis of Transfers to Households: see Beebout [7]. 
°See Betson et al [11, 12] and Betson and Bishop [10]. 
l o Comprehensive Human Resources Data: see King [77]. 
1 ~ See Vroman [148] for unemployment insurance; see Devine and 
Wertheimer [29] for National Health Insurance. 
12Office of Tax Analysis: see Wyscarver [157] and Cilke and 
Wyscarver [ 19]. 
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model. But the static nature continues to give 
problems. 
The first applicable dynamic microsimulation model 
- which went beyond demographic simulations - 
was developed between 1969 and 1976 at the Urban 
Institute and is called DYNASIM. 13 The first imple- 
mentation, MASH (see Sadowsky [131]), was a 
user friendly interactive programme, but too slow for 
practical applications. Therefore, two other systems 
were implemented: MASS (see Orcutt and Glazer 
[126]) and MICROSIM (see McKay [84]). 14 Both 
models are quite flexible, but user comfort is almost 
absent. They are still in use. Applications of DYNASIM 
have been taking place in the field of the effect of 
expected changes in work behaviour of women and 
of divorce patterns on the distribution of earnings and 
transfer income, in the field of forecasting the future 
costs and caseloads of public transfer programmes and 
in the field of the distributional impact of reforms in 
retirement income policy.l 5 For computational reasons 
a combined cross-sectional and longitudinal micro- 
simulator, DYNASIM2, has been developed (see 
Wertheimer et al [151]). DYNASIM2 consists of two 
connected models: the Family and Earnings History 
model (FEH) and the Jobs and Benefit History model 
(JBH). DYNASIM2 has been used for very different 
applications, such as the creation of alternative 
demographic and economic scenarios to 2030, the 
simulation of public sector costs of teenage childbearing 
and - in combination with the ICF Macroeconomic 
Demographic Model - the analysis of issues concerning 
the elderly population. 
A more limited (longitudinal) microsimulation 
model, but incorporating a number of dynamic 
elements, was developed by Schulz in 1968.16 It was 
aimed at simulating some alternative pension systems. 
However, no interactions were possible between 
individuals, even in the same household. 
As we remarked, a second large microsimulation 
development project started in the early 1970s in 
West Germany. It was initiated by the Social 
Policy Research Group Frankfurt-Mannheim (Sozial- 
politisches Entscheidungs- und Indikatorensystem 
(SPES) and later on adopted by the Special Collabora- 
tive Programme 3 (Sonderforschungsbereich 3, Sfb3).17 
Both a dynamic and a static model were initiated at 
the SPES. The static model (see Klanberg [78]) was 
developed to analyse proposals for tax reforms and 
changes in the old age pension system. A variant of 
this model was used to study the distributional 
implications of the contributions for the Sickness 
Act. 18 At the Sfb3, the model was developed further 
and used, for example, for the simulation of medical 
services (Brennecke [17]). The dynamic model was 
first developed by Hecheltjen [55]. This model did not 
contain links between household members, which 
limited its possibilities. The household mobility was 
improved by Steger [142], 19 whereas the socio- 
economic aspects were improved first at the SPES and 
later at the Sfb3 (see Krupp et al [80] and Galler and 
Wagner [42]). In addition to the cross-sectional 
model, a longitudinal model was developed to study 
the distributional aspects of the pension insurance and 
the financing of the educational system. 2° The dynamic 
version has only one major application (see Krupp 
et al [80] and Miiller and Steeger [94]). Recently, a 
PC version of the static microsimulation model (called 
MICSIM) has become available. 21 
To study the methodological aspects of micro 
modelling and microsimulation software, 'DPMS 
was developed at Darmstadt University: 22 see eg 
Appendino [3], Heike et al [58] and Hellwig [61,66]. 
The model has not been used for applications in West 
Germany. It has been transferred to the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office (HCSO), which used the 
model as a basis for developing the HCSO model, a 
dynamic microsimulation model for Hungary. 23 The 
HCSO model will serve various purposes: policy 
exploration and forecasting, substitution for surveys, 
correction and merging of survey data. The same 
model concept will also be used to construct a 
microsimulation model for the Australian household 
sector (see Hellwig [62]). 24 
At Leeds University a comprehensive microsimu- 
lation model has been developed to update the 
characteristics of households and individuals who 
reside in small geographical areas. Its main purpose 
is to provide information for intercensal years. The 
model, called UPDATE,  has been used for many 
applications in the pilot study area (the Leeds 
Metropolitan District). The methodology is described 
in Clarke and Holm [21] and an application can be 
found in Clarke et al [20]. 
Statistics Canada is also developing a dynamic cross- 
sectional microsimulation model (Wolfson [156]), 
~3 DYNAmic Simulation of Income Model: see Orcutt et al [127] 
and Haveman and Lacker [54] for an extensive description. 
t4Micro Analytic Simulation System (MASS); MICROanalytic 
Simulation Model (MICROSIM). 
15 See Wertheimer and Zedlewski [152] and Schieber and George 
[133]. 
16 See Schulz [134]. 
17See Galler and Wagner ([43], p229) for an overview of the 
development of the Sfb3 micromodels. 
is See Hamacher [48]. 
19 See also Galler and Steger [41]. 
2o Helberger [59] and Helberger and Wagner [60]. 
21 Merz and Buxmann [87]. 
22 Darmstadt Pseudo-MicroSimulator. 
23 See Zafir [158] and Cicsman and Papp [18]. 
2,, The project began in January 1990. 
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which is based on a static one (Statistics Canada, 
[141]). A longitudinal demographic simulation model 
is still present (Wolfson [154, 155]). 25 
From this overview it is clear that most microsimu- 
lation models for the household sector are developed 
for specific applications. Nationwide models exist only 
in limited numbers. And most of these are static. The 
only dynamic models in use are DYNASIM (and 
its derivation PRISM), the Sfb3 model, DPMS and 
NEDYMAS; the HCSO model and the model at 
Canadian Statistics are still being developed. However, 
in these models, too, the number of applied behavioural 
assumptions are limited. They are mainly used in the 
determination of labour supply, income and consump- 
tion and much less sophisticated or even absent from 
the field of demographic transitions and educational 
decisions (eg migration and unmarried cohabitation 
in most models). Long-term income developments are 
difficult to model and most microsimulation models 
are therefore actually short-term models. 
The general structure of NEDYMAS 
Our model NEDYMAS is a dynamic cross-sectional 
model. Demographic processes are explicitly simulated, 
which implies that the size of the microdata base 
changes during the simulation period. The sample 
passes through time year by year. For  each person in 
the micro database we investigated which personal 
characteristics changed, and to what extent, each year. 
The heart of microsimulation modelling is formed by 
its state representation of the components of the 
system of interest. This is executed by drawing up a 
list of attributes for each individual in the sample. The 
attributes for each individual, used by NEDYMAS, 
are given in Appendix 1, 
The storage of this list of attributes requires 512 
bytes per individual. Each time one of the attributes 
is changed, the attribute in question is overwritten. If 
it is desirable to keep some data for further analysis, 
they have to be transferred to tape. The next step, after 
the adaptation of a microrepresentation, is the 
specification of an initial population. We would prefer 
to use a real sample of individuals and households, 
together with their attributes. However, such a sample 
is not available. A first usable sample can be derived 
from the 1947 census data. 26 The construction of this 
initial population is described in Nelissen [119]; see 
also below. As a consequence, the first birth generation 
which can be followed over time is the generation born 
in 1930. 
25 See also Kennedy [76]. 
26 See eg NCBS [101-104].  
Once the initial population has been determined, 
our analysis can be carried out by updating the 
characteristics of individuals (and thus of households) 
during the period under investigation. Here, the Monte 
Carlo sampling procedure is applied. NEDYMAS has 
been organized modularly. So we do not have a mas- 
sive program, but rather a set of subprograms, which 
can be used - partly or completely - at will. For 
example, the demographic modules can be used to 
generate the household structure. The modules which 
are used in the current version of NEDYMAS and the 
sequence of treatment are given in Table 1. 
This means that like all microsimulation mode l s -  
NEDYMAS is a recursive model. First, all demo- 
graphic transitions are made in the model. Next 
education is considered, and thereafter changes in 
economic activity, with the resulting labour income. 
Lastly, the income transfers and taxes are modelled. 
As a consequence, changes in, for example, current 
year labour income do not affect the education process 
or the demographic block. There is one (partial) 
exception: labour income in the current year partly 
affects the possible change in economic activity. 27 This 
is graphically shown in Figure 1. 
Another problem in programming the model is 
the simultaneity of the processes. Generally, the 
periodicity of the data is one year, whereas the 
periodicity of the processes in the real world is much 
less. The processes can take place at any time within 
the year, also within one block, eg the demographic 
module. Therefore, more processes can take place 
simultaneously within one year. This simultaneity 
influences the calculation of the transition probabili- 
ties, when opting for a sequential ordering of events. 
In NEDYMAS the problem is solved by using the 
appropriate occurrence exposure rates, so that the 
sequence in which the processes are simulated has been 
taken into account. This means that a random 
determination of the sequence in which the processes 
and the individuals to be simulated are executed, as 
proposed by Hellwig ([63], pp 11-12), is unnecessary. 
Carrying out an analysis with the aid of NEDYMAS 
requires some simple control modules. The specifica- 
tion of a simulation requires the writing of a number 
of these control modules (to determine the simulation 
process and the desired output), compiling them 
(transition of the program into machine code) and 
linking them with the other modules needed. Unlike 
macroeconomic models, no simple computer software 
2~The decision which refers to labour supply uses the expected 
labour income for the current year. The changes in economic growth 
are taken into account in this exception. However, the changes in 
the working population in proportion to the total population are 
not considered. 
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Table 1. Programme module sequencing for each individual in NEDYMAS, version 1991/13. a 
Order Programme module Eligibility 
A. Demographic main module 
1. Incrementation 
2. Immigration 
3. Family reunification 
4. Emigration 
5. Return immigration Each 
6. Homes for the aged Each 
7. Nursing homes Each 
8. Institutions for the mentally disabled Each 
9. Psychiatric institutions Each 
10. Other institutions Each 
11. Death Each 
12. Frist marriage selection Each 
13. Remarriage selection Each 
14. Divorce Each 
15. Dehabitation b Each 
16. Cohabitation selection Each 
B. Labour, consumption and income main module (first part) 
17. Education Each person over 5 
18. Scholarship Each person in vocational college or at university 
19. Income percentile Each employed person 
20. Transitions from school Each person who leaves school 
21. Transitions from disablement Each disabled person 
22. Transitions from military service Each compulsory military servant 
23. Transitions from being employed Each employed person 
24. Transitions from being umemployed Each unemployed person 
25. Transitions from the state Each househusband/housewife 
househusband/housewife 
26. Retirement Each person aged 65 
27. Labour income Each person employed for part of the year 
C. Social security main module 
28. Private pension premiums 
29. Pension premiums for civil servants 
30. Deduction civil servants 
31. AOW benefits 
32. AWW benefits 
33. Widow, widower and orphan pensions 
under the ABP 
34. Family allowances 
35. AWW benefits 
36. ZW/DSO benefits 
37. WAO benefits 
38. Disablement pensions under the ABP 
39. Old age pensions under the ABP 
40. Unemployment benefits under the ABP 
41. WW/NWW benefits 
42. WWV benefits 
43. TW benefits 
44. IOAW benefits 
45. ABW benefits 
46. ZFW premiums (compulsory) 
47. DGV/IZA/IZR premiums 
48. ZFW premiums (voluntary) 
49. ZFW premiums for the aged 
50. Private health costs insurance 
51. Employers' contributions 
52. ZW premiums 
53. WAO premiums 
54. WW/NWW premiums 
55. AOW premiums 
56. AWW premiums 
57. Family allowances premiums 
58. AAW premiums 
59. AWBZ premiums 
Each person 
Adding persons who have not yet lived in the Netherlands to the datafile 
Adding persons whose partner or parent(s) immigrated earlier to the datafile 
Each family and each person over 16 
family and each person over 16 who had emigrated before 






never married person over 14 
previously married person 
married couple 
couple living together without being married 
person over 14 who is not living with someone, married or not married 
Each employee 
Each civil servant 
Each civil servant 
Each person over 64 
Widows and widowers and their children 
Each person, whose partner or father or mother has been insured under the ABP 
Each family with children 
Each disabled person 
Each employee and civil servant 
Each disabled former employee 
Each disabled former civil servant 
Each person who has ever been insured under the ABP 
Each person who was a civil servant before becoming unemployed 
Each person who was an employee before becoming unemployed 
Each person who was an employee before becoming unemployed and who cannot 
(any longer) claim a WW benefit 
Each person who receives an NWW, a WAO, an AAW or a ZW benefit 
Older and partly disabled unemployed employees 
Each family 
Each employee and some groups of benefit receivers 
Some groups of civil servants 
A subgroup of non-compulsory insured persons 
Persons over 64 years old 
Non-compulsory insured persons, not falling under 48, or 49 




Each person aged 15 to 65 
Each person aged 15 to 65 
Each person aged 15 to 65 (up to 1 July 1988) 
Each person aged 15 to 65 
Each person aged 15 and over 
B. Labour, consumption and income main module (second part) 
60. Medical consumption Each family 
61. Taxes Each person 
"See Appendix 2 for the acronyms. 
b We use the term 'cohabitation' only for people living together without being married. If they decide to separate we call this 'dehabitation'. 
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Demography  
Educat ion 
Economic a c t i v i t y  
Labour  income 
Red is t r i bu t i on  
x b 
x x 
X X X 
X X X 
Figure 1. The recursive structure of NEDYMAS. 
for microsimulation exists. The existing models are 
implemented in an ad hoc manner. This is understand- 
able, since microsimulation programming requires 
more effort than the management of the structure of 
time series data. We also opted for an ad hoc approach. 
The most recent version of NEDYMAS has been 
programmed in Fortran. The source code of both 
amounts to about 45 000 lines. 
Analyses with NEDYMAS can only be run under 
batch, not interactively. However, testing and de- 
bugging the program can be executed interactively. 
The disadvantage of this method of organization is 
that the program is not really user friendly. An 
experienced programmer, who knows the program, is 
needed to carry out modifications. The advantage, on 
the other hand, is that program development is rather 
simple. Moreover, flexibility is greater and the user 
can write his own routines. 
NEDYMAS needs a six pass per year system until 
1990, a seven pass per year system in 1990 and a 
nine pass per year system from 1991. 28 This large 
number of passes is needed because various prob- 
abilities can only be computed after the execution of 
certain modules (this holds, for example, for leaving 
the parental home), or because some checks and - if 
required -- some corrections have been made (eg the 
number of immigrants) and so on. The way in which 
the model runs through the various modules is shown 
in Table 2. 
28 A pass is defined as a sequence of (sub)modules  th rough  which 
each indiv idual  goes, before the next ind iv idua l  is t reated.  
The external data required - eg for the calculation 
of transition probabilities - are stored sequentially, 
whereas the list of attributes of the sample population 
members is stored using random access capability, 
This random access capability makes it very easy to 
execute interactions. If the receipt of a benefit depends 
on the characteristics of other household members, it is 
almost impossible to determine the eligibility for a 
benefit when applying sequential storage. 29 
The labour market and income formation 
module 
The labour market and income formation module 
contains the following submodules: education, scholar- 
ship, the determination of the income percentile, 
labour income, taxes and the transitions between the 
several possible economic activities (employed, un- 
employed, disabled, househusband/housewife, con- 
script, retired). 
The way in which the labour market and income 
formation module is passed through is shown in Figure 
2. When everyone has passed through the demo- 
graphic module, they enter the labour market and 
income formation module. Educational decisions are 
made first. If an individual is 6 years old, it is decided 
2~ For  tha t  reason benefit e l igibi l i ty  can only  be t rea ted in the first 
opera t ing  version of D Y N A S I M  D Y N A S I M / M A S H  which 
uses a r a n d o m  access me thod  in the r ight  way and is less 
sophis t ica ted  in the second version - D Y N A S I M / M A S S  - which 
uses a sequent ia l  me thod  (see Devine  and  Wer the imer  ([29],  p 55). 
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Initializations - new immigrants calculating various demographic transition rates 
Family reunification new immigrants - new emigration - return emigration - return immigration 
Adding any remaining immigrants (married women and children) 
Old people's home - mortality - marriage - divorce - dehabitation - cohabitation 
Matching individuals for marriage and cohabitation - calculating birth rates and leaving parental home rates 
- calculating inflow, outflow and throughflow probabilities for the education submodule 
Fertility - children leaving home entering school - repeating, removing and outflow from school 
Initializations for the labour market and income formation module 
Income percentile - scholarship - transitions between the various socioeconomic positions - determination 
term of office 
Comparison between numbers  of simulated employed and unemployed persons and the observed (or forecast) 
numbers  respectively and possible adaptations 
Labour  income - private pension premiums - pension premiums for civil servants - deduction civil servants - 
determination of labour [1] up to and including labour [6] 
Determination of level of benefits (only from 1991 on) and the new division in percentiles 
Benefits AOW, AWW, ABP pensions, child allowances, AAW, ZW, WAO,  WW, WWV and N W W  
(Necessary because the following benefits can only be calculated if all household members have gone through 
pass 6/5) 
Benefits TW, IOAW and ABW 
Determination of premium percentages of the employee insurances (from 1992 on) 
Premiums for the employee insurances (from 1992 on) and determination of the transfer of tax allowances 
between partners (from 1990 on) 
Determination of premium percentages of the social insurances 
Premiums for the social insurances and determination of taxes 
Demographic module 
All ind iv iduals  dealt wi th 
Write indiv i !ua l  to file 
Yes , L 
Simulation of 
(3) r e - e n t e r i n g  school 
Read one individual  from file 
No I 
All indiv iduals  dealt  with .~_ 
f~s 
Compare (un)employment  
I~ No 
Read one ind iv idual  from fi le 
t ; 
Simulation of 
(1) en t e r ing  school at age 6 or 7 




ID (4] scholarship 
(5) income percent i le  
[ 
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whether he or she enters school at that age or at the 
age of 7. If the individual is already at school, it 
is decided whether he or she repeats, moves up, goes 
to another type of school or ends education. When 
all 6- or 7-year-old children and all students have gone 
through this part of the model, the re-entering of 
education is simulated (part-time or full-time). 
Next, scholarship is simulated if the individual is at 
a vocational college or at university. The income 
percentile of people who have already finished the 
education process and are not yet 65 years old or who 
are part-time students, is adapted and it is investigated 
whether changes in their economic activity take place. 
If the year under consideration is 1988 or before, the 
number of simulated employed and unemployed men 
and women is compared with the real numbers and 
adjustments, if any, are executed. 
The exogenous variables in the equation for the 
mean and variance of labour income for the various 
cohorts are now known, and wage income can be 
determined for each employed person. 
The last element in the module under consideration 
is the determination of taxes. This is executed after the 
benefits from and contributions to social security have 
taken place. 
The educational submodule has been described in 
Nelissen [119]. Here, we successively present the 
changes in economic activity, labour income and 
taxes. 
Changes in economic activity 
Sixteen categories of economic activity are distin- 
guished:employee, self-employed, civil servant, retired, 
unemployed employee, unemployed civil servant, 
unemployed others, conscript, disabled employee, 
disabled civil servant, disabled others, student, house- 
wife or househusband, unemployed ex-disabled em- 
ployee, unemployed ex-disabled civil servant and 
unemployed ex-disabled others. 
The Labour Force Survey 1977 (Arbeidskrachten- 
tellin9) 3° is the starting point for the determination of 
the transition probabilities between the different states 
of economic activity. This survey contains information 
on the economic activity in 1976 and 1977 for men 
and women of all ages between 14 and 66 years. We 
have transformed the states used in the Labour Force 
Survey into six states: disabled, employed, unemployed, 
conscript, student and retired or working in own 
household (househusbands and housewives). Using 
these data, it is determined for each year for each 
individual whether his or her economic activity 
3°See NCBS [113]. 
changes. In this process, additional data are used, eg 
data referring to unemployment. 
In this process, the determination of the labour 
supply is an important element. Labour supply is 
determined with a labour supply equation, modelled 
by Van Soest et al [139], which explicitly takes 
account of demand-side restrictions. The labour 
supply of individual household members is considered 
in a neoclassical framework, in which after-tax wages, 
unearned income, the social security and tax system 
and household composition are taken into account. 
The starting point is a modified version of the model 
introduced by Hausman [52] in which the random 
preferences are included in the constant term rather 
than in the income coefficient. Instead of the error 
term that represents, among other things, the devia- 
tions from the preferred number of hours due to 
demand-side restrictions, the demand-side restrictions 
are modelled via distributional assumptions about job 
offers. Moreover, the number of hours of work is not 
a continuous variable, but a discrete one. The authors 
use four-hour intervals (0, 4, 8 and so on). It is assumed 
that employers offer jobs with fixed numbers of hours 
and workers face the market distribution of these 
employment opportunities. This market distribution 
of job offers does not differ between workers. The 
number of job offers for an individual (called N) is a 
drawing from a binomial distribution B(10, Poffer). So, 
the labour supply decision is a discrete choice between 
those N job offers and the decision not to work. 
The main idea of the model is that an individual is only 
observed to work h k ( > 0) hours if (s)he received at least one 
job offer hk and prefers this job offer to all different job offers 
which were received and to unemployment. The individual 
is unemployed if (s)he prefers zero hours of work to all job 
offers received or if (s)he received zero offers [Van Soest 
et al [139], p533]. 
For an extended description and the estimation 
results, see Van Soest et al ([139], pp 532-537). Here, 
we only indicate in which way we used these results 
in NEDYMAS. 
For each individual whose labour supply has to be 
determined, we calculate for which labour supply the 
utility was highest. For that purpose, utility is 
calculated when an individual does not work, and the 
N numbers of hours belonging to the job offers. For 
each of these numbers, we have to calculate his or her 
after-tax wage rate. The pre-tax wage rate is deter- 
mined as indicated below. Then, we investigate which 
benefits (s)he receives from social security taking 
into account the partner's income, if present. Last, 
the resulting tax and social security payments are 
calculated. Now the after-tax wage rate is known and 
the individual's utility can be calculated using the 
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estimated coefficients. 31 In doing this, we keep in mind 
the stochastic nature of the process. 
We will now deal with the possible transitions in 
the various states of economic activity. Transitions to 
the state of student are not considered here. These 
transitions take place in the education submodule and 
are described in Nelissen [119]. Transitions are only 
considered up to the age of 65 years old. From that 
age on, we assume that people are retired, do not work 
and consequently do not receive any labour income. 
Transitions from the state 'student'. If individuals 
leave full-time education, their new state is assigned 
by lot. The first step is to become disabled, un- 
employed, househusband/housewife or a conscript. In 
this process, we use the transition probabilities, given 
age and sex, from the Labour Force Survey 1977. This 
means that we assume that the transition probabilities 
into the states 'conscript', 'househusband/housewife' 
and 'disabled' are constant during the period under 
consideration. If someone becomes disabled (which 
implies state 11, 'disabled others') the degree of 
disability is determined. For that goal the distribution 
of WAO or AAW receiving persons by degree of 
disability has been used. 32 The attribute disabled 
becomes true and the year of disablement becomes the 
current year. If someone becomes a conscript or 
househusband/housewife, we have to fix the date at 
which that happens. If someone leaves the education 
process without a certificate, a randomly chosen date 
is taken in the current year. In the other case, we limit 
outselves to a randomly chosen date in the second 
half of the year. 
If the individual is unemployed (s)he becomes 
'unemployed others' (state 4) and labour supply has 
been determined. It is assumed that (s)he has been 
looking for a job since 1 May of the current year and 
that (s)he starts working after 1 August. So, the month 
of unemployment becomes month 5 (May) and the 
year of unemployment is the current year. If and when 
the individual finds a job is determined below. 
For  people leaving part-time education, the state 
(which had not changed as a consequence of entering 
part-time education) remains the same. Only their 
percentile is again determined. 
Transitions from the state "disabled'. Using the 
transition probabilities derived from the Labour Force 
Survey 1977 for age and sex, we determined whether 
disabled persons stay disabled or not. If we determine 
that the individual is no longer disabled, we have to 
determine whether he or she becomes unemployed 
(state 14, 15 or 16) or becomes a househusband/ 
housewife (state 13). 
If the individual becomes a househusband or 
housewife then (s)he either becomes state 13 or else 
labour supply has been determined and (s)he becomes 
state 14 if (s)he was an employee, before becoming 
disabled, state 15 if a civil servant before becoming 
disabled and state 16 otherwise. It is also assigned by 
lot when disability ends and unemployment or 
working in the household starts. In the case of 
becoming unemployed, the month drawn becomes the 
month of unemployment, whereas the year of un- 
employment becomes the current year. The attribute 
'disabled' is now false and the 'percentage disabled' 
becomes zero. If the individual could claim an AAW 
or a WAO benefit (see below), these benefits are paid 
until the moment of leaving the disablement state. 
Transitions from the state 'conscript'. The duration 
of being a liable military servant is fixed. For  the period 
up to 1964, it is assumed that conscription lasts 
18 months. Between 1964 and 1975 a duration of 
16 months is assumed, and from 1976 on 14 months. 
Those who become officers stay three months longer 
and non-commissioned officers two months longer. 
The probability of becoming an officer is about 0.5% 
and the probability of becoming a non-commissioned 
officer is 5%. If the period of conscription ends in the 
current year, we determine whether the individual 
becomes disabled, househusband or unemployed. We 
again use the transition probabilities derived from the 
Labour Force Survey 1977. 
If a person becomes disabled - state 11 (disabled 
others) - the percentage of disability is assigned by 
lot, the year of disability becomes the current year 
and the attribute 'disabled' becomes true. The month 
of disability has been drawn randomly. If someone 
becomes a househusband, the date at which that 
happens equals the month in which conscription ends. 
If an individual becomes unemployed, he acquires the 
state 'unemployed others' (state 4) and labour supply 
has been determined. The month of unemployment is 
set equal to the month in which conscription ends. It 
is also assumed that he is already looking for a job 
during the last three months of his conscription, but 
that the job does not start before the end of the 
conscription period. If and when he finds a job is again 
determined below. 
31 The coefficients that refer to prices (eg wages) are deflated by the 
price index number for the gross national income: see NCBS [95]. 
32 Social and Cultural Planning Agency ([137],p48). 
Transitions from the state 'employed'. First we decide 
using the transition probabilities from the Labour 
Force Survey 1977, whether a person becomes disabled 
(self-employed persons only), housewife/househusband 
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or conscript. The transition rates for the state 
'housewife/househusband' for the years 1977 and after 
are adjusted using Yheeuwes et al ([146], p45). 
If an individual becomes disabled, he or she acquires 
state 11, disabled others. Employees and civil servants 
only pass into the state disabled via the Sickness 
Benefit Law (ZW))  3 It is assumed that a person 
becomes disabled on 1 July of the current year. This 
means that (s)he receives (labour) income for half a 
year. The attribute 'disabled' becomes true, the 
percentage of disablement is assigned by lot and the 
year of disablement becomes the current year. If a 
person is conscripted, then the date of conscription is 
assigned by lot. Economic activity becomes 'conscript' 
(state 8) and wages are paid up to the date of 
conscription. If the individual becomes a househusband 
or housewife then (s)he acquires state 13. Until the 
date at which (s)he falls into this category, which is 
assigned by lot, labour income has been paid. 
If labour supply remains positive we investigate 
whether someone becomes unemployed or not. For 
that purpose we have to determine the unemployment 
probability from the state 'employed'. The starting 
point is the corresponding probability by age and sex 
in 1977, which can be determined from the Labour 
Force Survey 1977. In the light of the probability of 
becoming employed again by duration of unemploy- 
ment in 1977 and the number of persons at work in 
1976, but unemployed in 1977 (51 000 men and 21 000 
women according to the Labour Force Survey) we 
calculated that 220000 men and 74000 women lost 
their j o b s )  4 The number of persons who were laid off 
in the current year is determined up to 1988 by the 
1977 number, the change in the unemployment rate, 
the change in the probability of finding a job and a 
correction factor for the size of the labour force. For 
the period 1988-2020 we assume that unemployment 
declines by an annual growth in employment of 
0.5%. 35 After 2020, the number of lost jobs is assumed 
to remain at 130000 men and 130000 women. So the 
probability of becoming unemployed for men (women) 
by age in the current year is determined as the 
probability in 1977, multiplied by the number of men 
(women) who lost their jobs in the current year and 
the size of the (fe)male labour force in 1977 (3 478 000 
men and 1 191 000 women) and divided by the number 
of (wo)men dismissed in 1977 (220 000 men and 74 000 
women) and the size of the (fe)male labour force in 
the current year. This probability is adjusted for being 
a civil servant or not. Civil servants have a lower 
probability of being laid off. The correction factor is 
derived from Meesters [85]. Until 1956 a female civil 
servant is also dismissed if she marries. Corrections 
are also made for the level of education. The effect of 
the level of education on the probability of losing one's 
job is derived from Spannenburg [140]. For both the 
last adjustments, a correction is executed for changes 
in the structure of the level of education of the labour 
force and the proportion of persons working as civil 
servants, to guarantee consistency. 
Next, we decide by lot whether people are laid off 
or not. If they become unemployed, they acquire the 
economic activity 'unemployed employee' (state 6), 
'unemployed civil servant' (state 7) or 'unemployed 
others' (state 4), depending on the former state. We 
again assign by lot at which date they are dismissed. 
That date becomes the 'month of unemployment'  and 
up to that date labour income has been paid. The 'year 
of unemployment'  becomes the current year. 
Transitions from the state 'unemployed'. If a person 
is unemployed, we first decided whether (s)he remains 
unemployed or not. For that goal the exit probabilities 
out of the state unemployed are calculated for both 
men and women. For the period 1953 86 we know 
the number of new registrations at the labour 
exchange)  6 From NCBS [96], we have the number 
of registered unemployed persons, unemployed for 
less than three months, on 1 February, May, August 
and November of each year. Using these figures, we 
can calculate the exit probability out of the state 
'unemployed' during the first three months of un- 
employment. These two sources give us the proportion 
of people who became unemployed between two of 
the above dates and were no longer unemployed at 
the end of that period. Suppose that this is x%. Let 
100*exp(q) be the probability of being still unemployed 
after one day and assume that this probability does 
not change during the first three months and that the 
inflow is distributed uniformly over time. Let d 
be the number of days between two dates. Then we 
see that: 
x=d-1 fo e x p ( d -  t)*q = [exp(d*q)-  1]/(q*d) ,d~ 
(1) 
From Equation (1) we can determine q numerically. 
The monthly exit probability during the first three 
months of being unemployed (p) is now: 
p= 1 -exp(q*d)  (2) 
33 When sickness lasts one year. 
3,* See Corpeleijn ([23], p 651 ). 
3~ See Departementale Werkgroep SZW [28]. 
36 See for the period 1953 77 Hartog [50] and for later years NCBS 
[96]. 
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Using the data from NCBS [96] we can also derive 
the probability of moving out of the state of being 
unemployed between three and six months and the 
exit probability in the second half year of unemploy- 
ment. Up to 1978, this last exit probability was also 
applied to persons who were unemployed for one year, 
one and a half years, and so on. For the years 1978 
and after, the yearly exit probabilities are also known 
for persons who are unemployed for one year, two 
years and three years. 37 While data before 1953 are 
lacking, the 1953 probabilities are also applied to the 
years 1947 up to and including 1952. For the years 
1987 and after, we assume that the exit probabilities 
remain constant at the 1986 level. 
These general exit probabilities are corrected for 
individuals for their level of education. The correction 
factors are determined on the basis of the Labour Force 
Survey 1977 and 1985. 38 Between these two years, 
the correction factors are interpolated. For  the years 
1976 and before, the correction factor for the year 
1977 is the starting point. The figures for 1977 are 
adjusted for the changes in the level of education of 
the unemployed in comparison with 1977. For  the 
years 1986 and after the procedure is analogous, with 
1985 as the year of departure. From 1973 on, we also 
adjusted the exit probability if the person was disabled 
before becoming unemployed (now acquiring state 14, 
15 or 16). The Labour Force Surveys show that exit 
probabilities have decreased relatively since that year. 
On the basis of this exit probability, it is assigned 
by lot whether an individual will leave unemployment 
or not in the current year. If he or she leaves 
unemployment, it is also assigned by lot at which date 
(between the dates in question) this happens. Until 
this date, any possible unemployment benefit has been 
paid. Using the transition probabilities derived from 
the Labour Force Survey 1977, we again investigated 
whether the person becomes disabled (only for persons 
in state 4 or 16), becomes a househusband/housewife 
(state 13) or enters the state of conscript. If he or she 
becomes disabled the state becomes 11, the year of 
disablement becomes the current year, the attribute 
'disabled' is now true and the percentage of disable- 
ment is assigned by lot. If he is conscripted, the 
assigned date is the date of conscription. If the person 
does not become disabled, a househusband/housewife 
or a conscript, his or her labour supply is determined. 
We assume that (s)he has found a job, for the number 
of hours that follow from the optimization of the 
labour supply. The year and month of employment 
are given by the aforementioned date. Next the state 
the individual acquires - civil servant, employee or 
self-employed - is assigned by lot. This depends on 
the income percentile in which he or she is classified. 
The distribution of self-employed persons, employees 
and civil servants over the different percentiles is based 
on the income distribution for the year 1979. 39 For 
the period 1947-65, a correction is made for the fact 
that married women were not considered for jobs as 
civil servants. Another correction was made for the 
relative size of the three groups, in which we assumed 
that no changes took place in this distribution after 
1986. 40 
Transitions from the state "househusband/housewife'. 
If an individual is in state 13, househusband or 
housewife, we decide for each year, using the transition 
probabilities from the Labour Force Survey 1977, 
whether the person becomes disabled (self-employed 
persons only) or is conscripted. If (s)he becomes 
disabled, (s)he acquires state 11, otherwise is disabled. 
It is assumed that the person becomes disabled on 1 
July of the current year. The attribute 'disabled' be- 
comes true, the percentage of disablement is assigned 
by lot and the year of disablement becomes the current 
year. If the individual has to do military service, then 
the date of conscription is assigned by lot. Economic 
activity becomes 'conscript' (state 8). 
Adjustments in the economic activity of the population. 
When the above mentioned transitions have taken 
place, the simulated number of employed and un- 
employed persons will generally differ from the actual 
or predicted number of employed and unemployed 
persons. One reason for this is that we did not take 
account of the possibility of transitions from the state 
househusband/housewife to the state unemployed. 
Therefore we compare the simulated numbers with the 
actual or predicted figures. For the period 1990-2029 
we use the forecasts of Departementale Werkgroep 
SZW [28]. For the years 2030 on we assume that the 
number of unemployed persons remains constant and 
that the labour force participation rates remain 
constant at the 2029 level. Now we are able to compare 
the simulated numbers (corrected for the sample size) 
with the actual numbers and to adjust the economic 
activity of the population if the numbers differ too 
much. We carry out this correction while the estima- 
tion of the parameters of the labour supply function 
is executed with data referring to the year 1985. It is 
quite debatable whether people in, for example, the 
1950s show the same employment behaviour. 
3~ See for example Social and Cultural Planning Agency, SCP 
([138], p311). 
38 See NCBS [113,117]. 
39See NCBS [115]. 
40 See NCBS [95]. 
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First, the simulated and the true numbers of 
unemployed men and women are compared. If the 
simulated number is less than the actual one, the 
simulated number is then raised by giving persons who 
are househusband/housewife or employed, the state 
'unemployed'. This process continues until the simu- 
lated number of unemployed persons equals the true 
number. If the simulated number is larger than the 
true number of unemployed persons, then the simulated 
number is reduced by giving the corresponding 
number of unemployed persons in the sample the 
state 'househusband/housewife'. This also happens 
randomly. 
The simulated and actual numbers of employed men 
and women are now compared. The procedure is 
analogous. If the simulated number is less than the 
true one, the simulated number is increased by 
randomly giving people who are househusband or 
housewife, the state 'employed'. If after this operation 
the simulated number is still less than the true number, 
persons are randomly drawn from the pool of people 
who are disabled. Using the labour supply function, 
we determine whether their labour supply is positive 
and, if so, they are added to the employed population. 
This process continues until the simulated number of 
employed persons equals the true number. If the 
simulated number is larger than the real number of 
employed persons, then the simulated number is 
reduced by giving the corresponding number of 
employed persons in the sample, the state 'house- 
husband/housewife'. This is done randomly. 
Finally we test whether the employed population is 
correctly subdivided between the categories employees, 
civil servants and self-employed persons. If this is not 
the case, economic status is adjusted to obtain the 
right numbers. 
The economic activity of the init&l population and 
immigrants. If a person left education before 1947, 
the income percentile is fixed in the way described 
below. First the required number of conscripts is 
drawn from the population. For the remaining 
persons, it is simulated whether they were in the labour 
force or not, using the participation rates from the 
1947 census. 41 We differentiate by age, sex and marital 
status. The unemployment rate by sex in 1947 is used 
to simulate whether (s)he has a job or not. If it is 
decided that a person is unemployed, the status 
becomes 'unemployed others' (state 4), the year of 
unemployment is 1946 and the month of unemploy- 
ment is assigned by lot. If the individual has 
a job, it is assigned by lot (using his or her income 
percentile) whether (s)he is an employee, civil servant 
• 1 See NCBS [103]. 
or self-employed. If a person is not in the labour force, 
he or she acquires state 13, househusband or housewife. 
This means that we do not consider the state 'disabled' 
in the initial simulation. 
If a person has immigrated in the current year and 
(s)he has already reached school age, his or her level 
of education is simulated up to the year in question. 
If we have to deal with a 'new' immigrant, (s)he flows 
twice through the education process and the lowest 
level of education is assigned to this person. This 
procedure results in a level of education that is quite 
near the real level. 
If education was completed before the current year 
and the person is younger than 65 years (otherwise 
he/she acquires state 3, retired), then the economic 
activity is determined. First, it is decided (using the 
probabilities derived from the Labour Force Survey 
1977) whether (s)he is disabled or not. If so, the pointer 
'disabled' becomes true, the state becomes 'disabled, 
others' (state 11) and the percentage of disablement 
is assigned by lot. If the person is not disabled, his or 
her labour supply is determined, using the labour 
supply function. If this labour supply is zero or 
negative, (s)he becomes a househusband or housewife 
(state 13). If it is positive, the person gets the state 
'unemployed others' (state 4). It is assumed that people 
start looking for a job three months before they 
immigrate. This determines the year and month of 
unemployment. Next, we follow the procedure as 
described for school leavers, on the basis that a job 
cannot start before the date of immigration. 
Labour income 
The distribution of lifetime earnings is generally 
derived from panel data or a pooling of cohort and 
cross-sectional data, covering only a relatively very 
small part of the period where a person earns money. 
In the most favourable cases, the period under 
investigation spans about ten years, so that the 
agemarnings profile does not relate to the complete 
lifetime earnings of any one individual. 42 The re- 
searcher usually starts from the widely accepted 
assumption that at a particular age earnings are 
distributed lognormally; the development of the mean 
of the logarithms of earnings to age has been assumed 
to follow a quadratic function in the variable age, 
whereas the variance is assumed to follow a linear 
function in the variable age (see for example Fase 
1-35]). 43 Sometimes other variables are added. 44 The 
,*2 See eg Creedy and Hart [27] and Fase [35]. 
43 This immediately follows from the assumption that log income 
at age t equals log income at age t 1 plus a systematic term and 
an additive random shock. 
,,4 For example, Creedy and Hart [27] use dummies for the different 
birth cohorts. 
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functions are estimated and the distribution of lifetime 
earnings is determined in this way. In a similar way, 
it is possible to describe the distribution of earnings 
in a particular year. 
In addition to the fact that the functions for different 
cohorts are based on a (too) limited period, this 
procedure has another important drawback. It is 
hardly possible to derive the distribution of earnings 
for the future or for the past, because the parameters 
of the aforementioned quadratic and linear functions 
for the mean ~tt and variance o2 differ between 
generations and years. This is, of course, the result of 
the fact that these functions are not based on 
theoretical arguments, but only on empirical insight. 45 
Therefore it is hardly possible to derive the distribution 
of lifetime earnings. Fase [37] claims that his model 
can be used for this purpose. However, in practice he 
can only provide us with the geometric mean. His 
method also only holds for homogeneous educational 
or occupational categories, so that the method cannot 
be applied to the total population of a country, which 
severely limits its application. The foundation of this 
kind of stochastic models is weakened by the result of 
the Thatcher [145] and Taubman [144] tests. Sahota's 
conclusion in his 1978 survey on personal income 
distribution theories is clear: 'The old stochastic 
theory of distribution is apparently in disrepute' 
(Sahota [132], p9). 
The course of lifetime earnings can be explained in 
two ways. We can either work in a completely 
descriptive manner, or we can select an appropriate 
function on the basis of income formation theories. 
The first approach has the disadvantage that the user 
does not know what determines the course of the 
income curve, so that the forecast of the future 
becomes very speculative. However, if we want to 
know the real line of the age-earnings profile, of, for 
example, the birth generation of 1950, knowledge of 
the future is of vital importance. On the other hand, 
the method has the advantage that (part of) the course 
of the profile can be determined in a very simple way 
using only relatively few data. This does not hold for 
the second method, in which microdata are preferred. 
Unfortunately, these data are not available for a 
sufficiently long period for most countries, 46 so this 
method is not an obvious choice. In the light of the 
available data for the Netherlands, we opt for a 
pragmatic approach in which we estimate ~t and ~z 
using macrodata and extending the model used by eg 
Creedy and Hart  [27]. We drop the assumption that 
,*5 Human  capital theory also gives a inverted U-shaped profile for 
~t. The statistical model for l~t can also be interpreted in this way: 
see Fase [36]. 
46The USA and the UK are probably the only exceptions: see 
Atkinson et al [4, 5]. 
log income in the current year equals log income in 
the foregoing year plus a systematic term and an 
additive random shock. So, the limitation to homo- 
geneous categories does not hold. 
Following a description of the data, we then discuss 
the model. Next, we estimate mean male full-time 
income and variance by age. Lastly, we show how we 
use these results to simulate the age-income profile 
for individuals. 
The data. Since 1962, the Netherlands Central 
Bureau of Statistics (NCBS) has published (aggregated) 
earnings data for individuals. Before 1962 the house- 
hold was the income unit, so that for married people 
individual income, and thus mean (aggregated) in- 
come, was not available. We use the kerninkomen, 
which gives the sum of the income components which 
are characteristic of each socioeconomic category. As 
a consequence, the same income elements are included 
in the kerninkomen of self-employed persons, civil 
servants, employees, and managers of private and 
limited liability companies and corporations. Kernin- 
komen can be considered as primary income excluding 
income from capital. This will be our income concept. 
This means that we use the income from labour of the 
self-employed, employees, and managers of private 
and limited liability companies and corporations. 47 
From the NCBS we have received data for different age 
groups for both males and females for the years 1967, 
1970, 1975, 1983 and 1985. Available data for other 
years are not used because these data are not com- 
pletely comparable. Some changes in definitions have 
also taken place in the data used. 48 From these pooled 
cross-sectional data, we can derive 46 observations for 
the mean income and the variance: six age groups in 
1967 and ten age groups in the other years: see Figure 3. 
Because we are using pooled cross-sectional data, 
individuals aged about 17.5 years in 1970, for example, 
who earned on average about 4800 guilders then, are 
not the same people as those in 1975 aged 22.5 years 
who earned on average about 18 300 guilders in that 
year. No doubt, many of these people were the same, 
but because some people had left the labour force, and 
others of the same age had entered the labour force 
between these two years, these data do not exactly 
measure the earnings of the cohort born around 
1939-40 in this example. In interpreting our results, 
we must realize that they only hold for those people 
who are in the labour force at the time under 
investigation. The mean labour income by age is given 
in Figure 3. 
47 Some benefits for the unemployed are included and cannot be 
isolated. However, their impact during the period under investi- 
gation was limited. 
48See NCBS [106-112, 114-116]. 
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Figure 3. The age income profile for the Netherlands: 1967, 
1970, 1975, 1983 and 1985. 
The variance is based on grouped data. The number 
of income brackets varies between 13 and 32. This 
means that the true inequality is underestimated, while 
the inequality within brackets is ignored. The degree 
of underestimation depends on the number of income 
brackets. Empirical studies show that the underesti- 
mation is limited to a few per cent when ten or more 
income brackets are used (eg Gastwirth [44], and 
more specifically for the Netherlands, Odink and Van 
Imhoff [123]). 
The model. Our point of departure is the statistical 
model, adapted from Aitchison and Brown [1] and 
Fase [35], which describes the distribution of indivi- 
dual income by age. Individual income has been 
considered as a random variable related to age. The 
individual is assumed to start his career at age s, at 
which (s)he receives an annual income equal to .vs. 
This variable Ys is assumed to follow a two-parameter 
lognormal distribution and age is considered to be a 
discrete variable. This implies: 
P(y~ < ys) = A(ys; #~, a~ z) (3) 
with 
~ Y~ a~ ~/2~)-1,  A(ys;/is, s )=  (y.o~. 
d O  
exp[ - ½((log y -/&)/ors) 2] dy 
Thus 




A(y,; #,, o~}= (y.o,.x/2rc) 1, 
e x p [ -  ½((log y -/~,)/cr,) 2] dy 
Using x, = log Y t Equation (4) can be transformed into 
the normal distribution, so that for all ages: 
F{xlt) = N{x,;/z t, o~ z } (5) 
This model has been extensively tested by Creedy [25]. 
As mentioned before, the usual procedure is to 
determine the distribution of the complete age income 
profile by introducing a quadratic function in the 
variable age for ~, and a linear one for o 2 (eg Fase 
[35] and Creedy [26]), whereby in some cases dummy 
variables for different cohorts are also used (eg Creedy 
and Hart  [27]). Although this approach gives a rather 
good description for the age-earnings profile within 
a year, or for (part of) a generation, the problem is 
that the parameters of the quadratic and linear 
functions are not, of course, constant over time and 
differ between generations. So this method can hardly 
be used to describe the future profile, unless we are 
able to predict and explain the parameters. But in that 
case we would prefer to look for a better model. We 
will follow this method by introducing theoretically 
interpretable variables. 
The foregoing only implies that labour income at 
every age follows a lognormal distribution. No 
assumptions have been made concerning the distri- 
bution of labour income over a range of years. 49 
While /~,, being the mean of the logarithm of the 
income at age t, cannot be calculated from the data, 
we will estimate the logarithm of the mean income 
(called logcq). For the same reason we will estimate 
the variance of the income (/3z)instead of the variance 
of the logarithm of the income (a2). Then, /~, and 
a~ can be determined via / t t = l o g ~ t - ~ * a  ~ and 
/3~ = ~*[(exp(a~}}-  13 .50 
The estimation o f  ct and/3. A general model for logc~ 
is: 
If we also assume that the distribution of proportional 
changes in income with increasing age is a normal 
one, which is a realistic assumption, then income 
follows a lognormal distribution for all ages (see Hart  
[49]). 
log 7, = X I ./3 + Z~. r + ~:t (6} 
49Generally, this last distribution is not the normal one and 
probably it will be leptokurtic: see Hill [67]. 
5°See Aitchison and Brown ( I l l ,p8) .  
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where 
Xt=  (Xtl . . . . .  X..) '  a vector of m explanatory vari- 
ables, which represent individual attributes 
which are fixed over time (eg sex, formal 
education) 
Z ,  = ( Z , I  . . . . .  Ztk ), a vector of k explanatory vari- 
ables, which represent individual attributes, 
which vary over time (such as family status and 
job related characteristics) 
/3 = (/31 . . . . .  /3,.)' a vector of parameters 
z = (rl . . . . .  rk)' a vector of parameters 
e ,=er ror  term, representing unobserved charac- 
teristics 
Now two problems arise. The first one is what 
explanatory variables have to be included in Equation 
(6). A review of theories can be found in Sahota [132]. 
An all-embracing general theory, however, is not 
available. Theories of primary income formation 
can be divided into four categories (see eg Hagenaars 
and Wunderink-Van Veen [47]): 
(i) Theories based on free choices, in which consumers 
try to maximize their utility. This implies among 
others the following explanatory variables: educa- 
tion, age, household composition and type of job. 
(ii) Theories in which characteristics of the parents 
explain the income profile: inheritance of genetic 
characteristics and social environment. 
(iii) Theories based on chance mechanisms. 
(iv) Theories based on imperfect markets, for example 
segregated labour markets. 
Some theories combine these four types. These theories 
are termed by Sahota 'more complete theories'. They 
seem to be the most appropriate for our purpose. Our 
second problem now becomes apparent: we must limit 
ourselves to macrodata and this means that we have 
to use explanatory variables which are aggregate 
approximations of elements that are at work at the 
micro level. Besides, data are not available for all the 
variables that should be included. 
We limit ourselves to the following variables: 
(i) The development in the logarithm of the income 
per head of the working population, NI. 
(ii) Age minus 15 years, AGE15, and its square, 
AGE152. 
(iii) The unemployment rate for each age group as a 
proportion of the average unemployment rate by 
age, U N. 
(iv) The proportion of people with primary or 
secondary education by cohort, EDL. 
Because the development in mean income depends on 
the growth in national income, and on the size of the 
Table 3. G L S  estimation results for log ~,. 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Intercept  - 0.122 - 0.27 
NI 0.908 27.01 
UN - 0 . 0 1 1  --0.34 
AGE 15 0.069 15.27 
AGE152 - - 0 . 1 0 4 E - - 2  --12.70 
EDL - 0 . 1 6 8  - 1.63 
R2aj = 0.990 cr = 0.050 
Mean  l o g s =  10.24 Obse rva t ions  =41  
earning population, given by the proportion of the 
working population in the total population, the 
inclusion of the variable NI is self evident. This 
variable is, like the dependent variable, measured in 
constant 1980 prices. We expect, of course, a positive 
effect of NI on mean income by age. According to 
human capital theory, one would prefer an inverted 
U-shaped profile in the variable age. The variables 
AGE15 and AGE152 are therefore inserted. UN is 
inserted because relatively high unemployment, in- 
dicative of a larger gap between labour supply and 
labour demand, could put pressure on labour income. 
Lastly, we have the variable EDL. It is assumed that 
a higher level of education means a larger marginal 
productivity and thus a higher income per worker. 
Studies of the effect of education on earnings confirm 
this picture; human capital theory also leads to this 
conclusion. 51 We therefore assume that a reduction 
in the proportion of persons with only a primary 
education has a positive effect on mean income. 
Because individual female income profiles are 
heavily affected by strong fluctuations in labour 
supply, while changes in male income profiles are 
rather limited, we limit ourselves to the explanation 
of male mean income and its dispersion. For  this we 
use full-time income for males of 20 years and older. 
The estimation results can be found in Table 3. 
The goodness of fit as measured by the adjusted R 2 
is very high. All variables have the expected sign. The 
coefficients of the age variables imply that income 
increases up to the age of about 48 years. Thereafter 
it declines. If the logarithm of the national income, 
corrected for the proportion of the working population 
in the total population, increases by 1 percentage 
point, then the logarithm of the mean income rises by 
0.908 in each age group. The relative unemployment 
rate is not significant. An increase in the variable EDL 
by 1 percentage point results in a decline in the 
logarithm of mean income of 0.168. 
In a similar way a regression equation for the 
51 For a review, see eg Freeman [40]. 
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Table 4. GLS estimation results for fl/~. 
Variable 
Intercept 
N I  
U N  
A G E I 5  
A G E I 5 2  
E D L  
Ra2,tj = 0.899 
Mean fl/~ = 0.702 
G = 0 . 0 7 7  
Observat ions  = 41 
Coefficient t-value 
2.070 2.85 
-0 .255  4.63 
0.210 3.18 
0.043 5.21 
- 0 . 0 5 7 E - 2  - 3 . 5 5  
0.387 1.57 
logarithm coefficient of variation flt/:~, has been 
estimated. Here, the same explanatory variables are 
inserted. It is assumed that income inequality de- 
creases if the level of education increases. The variable 
E D L  has been used to measure this impact on income 
inequality. The sign should be positive: a decrease in 
the proportion of less educated people reduces in- 
equality. For  the variable N I  we assume an analogous 
mechanism: an increase in N I  decreases income 
inequality. To cover the impact of changes in the 
distribution of productivity as age increases (for 
example as a consequence of a larger inequality in 
health) the variables AGE15 and AGE152 are also 
incorporated. The effect of differences in unemploy- 
ment rates between age groups is measured by the 
variable UN.  We expect a positive sign: the larger the 
unemployment, the larger the income inequality. The 
regression result is given in Table 4. 
Again, the variables have the expected sign, and are 
all with exception of E D L  significant. A 1% 
decrease in the proportion of persons with less 
education results in a decrease in income inequality, 
as measured by fl/~, of 0.387%. A rise in the logarithm 
of the national income, corrected for the proportion 
of the working population in the total population (NI) ,  
reduces income inequality. If relative unemployment 
is large in an age group, the resulting income inequality 
will be relatively somewhat larger. The coefficients of 
the variables AGE15 and AGEI52  show that income 
inequality increases as age increases. Maximum in- 
equality is reached at the age of about 63. 
We have now implicitly derived the age-income 
profile for the period 1967-81 (the estimation period 
for both equations). For the past, the observations for 
the different variables were used. For  the future, we 
make the following assumptions. National income will 
grow by 2% a year. Employment rises by 0.5% per 
year up to 2020. The unemployment rate is derived 
from Departementale Werkgroep Ministerie van SZW 
[28], but adapted for unemployment figures in 1990. 
The other variables are obtained from the NEDYMAS 
results. We will use these results to simulate the income 
of individuals. 
The individual age-income profih,. The distribution 
of the age income profile, determined above, is a 
distribution at the macro level. For every year we can 
indicate what the mean income is and what its variance 
will be for each age. 
If we now know in which quantile of the distribution 
an individual is, we are able to say what his or her 
income will be. Let vq be the qth quantile of the normal 
distribution, with mean zero and variance one. For 
rq, being the qth quantile of the lognormal distribution 
with mean /~ and variance a z (parameters which are 
determined above), the following holds: 
rq = exp(# + vq.a) (7) 
The implication for our model NEDYMAS is that, if 
we know for each age in which quantile an individual 
is, we also know his or her lifetime income profile. An 
individual leaving school is assigned a percentile by 
lot. The percentile drawn depends on sex and level of 
education. The probabilities are based on Corpeleijn 
[23], which contains the mean full-time labour income 
and its variance for persons, aged 23 and 24 years old, 
by age and level of education for the years 1979 and 
1985. Using these data, we simulated the distribution 
by percentiles for different levels of education for both 
men and women. A procedure is used to maintain 
consistency if the distribution of persons leaving 
school changes by level of education. With the help 
of this distribution and the level of education the 
percentile is assigned by lot in the year in which the 
person leaves the educational process. 
Income mobility has been modelled using Alessie et 
al [2]. These authors used (micro-)data from the first 
four waves of the Socio Economic Panel, collected by 
the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (NCBS), 
held in April 1984, October 1984, April 1985 and 
October 1985. In this panel only after-tax wages are 
discussed. These after-tax wages were transformed into 
taxable income. Alessie et al then estimate the taxable 
income of people who have a paid job. Although this 
income concept differs from ours (it is primary income; 
for the differences, see Nelissen [122], Table 1.3, and 
footnote 11 in Chapter 1), we will use their results 
because these are the only available microdata, s2 
While Alessie et al do not correct for part-time labour 
force participation, and our model is based on full-time 
annual income, we only use their results for heads of 
households. From this group, the larger part works 
full time. Alessie et al adapt the following model: 
Yii t = X i t . f l  Av 4) i [ -  g i t (8)  
52 The Socio Economic Panel data are not available for this study 
in view of its costs. If they were available we could have transformed 
the after-tax wages into before-tax wages. 
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in which Y, is the logarithm of individual i's income 
in year t; X'it is a vector of explanatory variables, fl is 
a vector of parameters,  tpi is a normally distributed 
error term with mean zero and variance a,~ and eit is 
a normally distributed error term with mean zero and 
variance a 2. The error terms (Pi and eit are independent. 
This specification implies a stochastic part composed 
of an individual effect (tp~) and a time-independent 
effect (e~t). The first part  stands for differences between 
persons, such as differences in natural ability and in 
labour ethos, which are not incorporated in the 
systematic part of Equation (8), Xit.fl and which do 
not differ over time. The second part stands for other 
elements which are not incorporated in the systematic 
part. These factors are allowed to vary over individuals 
as well as over time. The first of the stochastic 
specification can be considered to be implicitly 
incorporated in our assignment of the percentile an 
individual belongs to after leaving school. Alessie et 
al [2] use the following explanatory variables: the 
natural logarithm of age, its square, dummy variables 
for level of education and dummy variables for type 
of education. This results for a ff in an estimated value 
of 0.11. We use this value to determine income 
mobility in our model. The starting point is the 
percentile the individual is assigned. Each year, the 
income belonging to this percentile is determined using 
the results for the mean income and its variance for 
the individual's birth cohort (using Tables 3 and 4). 
This income is adjusted for the development of e., 
according to: 
Y/t = exp(/~. + Uit. O'it "~- t i t  - -  ~ i , t -  1 ) (9) 
in which Y. is the income of individual i in year t, #it 
is the mean of log income of i's birth cohort in year t, 
v. is i's percentile assigned for year t, a~, is the variance 
of log income of i's birth cohort in year t and e. is 
drawn from the normal distribution with mean zero 
and variance 0.11. When each person has passed 
through the labour income submodule, each person's 
percentile is again determined. 
Given the percentile in which the individual is 
classified, his or her age, the calculated NI,  UN and 
EDL, and the random draws from the normal 
distribution, his or her full-time labour income for the 
current year is determined. Multiplying this full-time 
labour income by the participation rate and the 
number of months worked in the current year divided 
by 12 gives earned labour income. 
Taxes 
Because we have limited ourselves to labour income, 
only income taxes have to be considered, s3 In the 
53 All data used in this submodule are derived from NCBS [97]. 
Dutch income tax system, the taxes to be paid are 
determined by the tax group in which one is classified 
and the tax rate (which differs among tax groups up 
to 1973). Because NEDYMAS starts its calculations 
in 1947, the model contains the different variants of 
the Dutch income tax system from that year on. 
Between 1947 and 1972 the Dutch income tax 
system consisted of three tax groups. Tax group III  
applied to persons who were entitled to family 
allowances. The tax rate within this group also 
depended on the number of children for whom family 
allowances were received. Tax group II applied to 
married persons who could not claim family allow- 
ances, to divorced and widowed persons, who were 
65 years or older or had been married for at least five 
years, and to never married persons who had reached 
the age of 65 years. All other persons came within tax 
group I. Each of these tax groups had a different 
personal tax allowance. From 1955, disabled (but 
younger than 65 years old) and aged people received 
an extra income tax deduction. Married women were 
not taxable. Their income was added to the husband's  
and tax was levied on this combined income. 
Separate tax tables existed for all tax groups. The 
tax to be paid was fixed in these tables for different 
income groups. The number of different income 
groups was very large. For example, tax group I 
contained 1507 income groups in 1972! For  practical 
reasons, we have approximated this tax system by a 
derived graded system of income brackets for tax 
assessment, one for tax group I and another for the 
other tax groups. It appears that the marginal income 
tax rates hardly differ between tax groups II and III ,  
and within group III ,  if we take account of the 
personal tax allowances. So we could limit ourselves 
to a number of income groups that range from 16 
income groups for tax groups II and III  in 1947 to 34 
income groups for tax group I in 1948, 1949 and 1950. 
In 1973 the Dutch labour income tax system was 
revised. Under this revision four tax groups are 
distinguished, which determine the personal tax 
allowance. One tax rate system is applied to taxable 
income, independent of the tax group. The number 
of income groups is limited: eight in 1973 and 1974 
and nine from 1975 on. Up to and including 1982 the 
aged were allowed an extra income deduction. The 
deduction differed between married and non-married 
persons. Also up to and including 1982, disabled 
persons were allowed an extra deduction, if they were 
younger than 65 years old and disabled at least 45°/0. s4 
Since 1973 self-employed people have received an extra 
deduction if their income is below a certain level. Up 
54 In 1981 two groups were distinguished: those with a degree of 
disability of more than 80% and those whose disability was less. 
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to 1978 there was a tax deduct ion for children. The 
deduct ion depended on the number  of children and 
on whether or not family allowances were claimed 
under the Family Allowance Act for Wage-Earners.  
For  the years 1973 up to and including 1989, the 
classification into tax groups  was determined by sex, 
age, marital status, presence of children, partner 's  
income and labour  participation. Dur ing  these years, 
the precise classification changed a number  of times. 
The last adapt ion  (in 1985) resulted in the following 
tax group classification: 
1 all persons not belonging to tax groups (II), (IID 
or (IV); 
I! (a) single persons, aged 27 years or older, who 
cannot  claim family allowances; 
(b) non-marr ied,  non-cohabi t ing  persons, aged 
27 years or older, with children up to 27 years 
old belonging to the household,  for whom no 
claims on family allowances exist; 
I I I  ( a ) m a r r i e d  persons, whose partner  has no 
income; 
(b) cohabit ing,  non-marr ied  persons, aged 27 
years or older, whose partner  has no income 
and is 18 years or  older; 
IV ( a )non -cohab i t i ng ,  non-marr ied  persons, who 
can claim family allowances for children 
belonging to their household;  
(b) single non-marr ied  persons, who can claim 
family allowances. 
In 1990 the proposals  of  the so-called Oor t  Commit tee  
became operative. These proposals  have resulted in a 
relatively radical change in the tax system and in the 
way in which premiums for the general social 
insurances are levied. Labour  income taxes and the 
premiums for AOW,  A W W ,  A A W  and A W B Z  are 
combined in one levy. 55 This also implies a transfer 
of the A A W  and A W B Z  premiums from employers 
to employees. Employees are compensated  for this 
transfer by an extra allowance on the labour  income. 
The maximum premium income equals the first income 
tax group from now on. The nine income tax 
groups  are replaced by only three groups,  and 
the premiums for general insurances are no longer 
deductible. N o w  six tax groups are used: 
I Married or cohabi t ing persons who transfer their 
tax allowance to their partner.  The tax allowance 
for the person in this group becomes zero. 
II (a) Married or cohabit ing persons in a household 
in which both partners earn an income above 
the tax allowance (Dfi4568 in 1990); 
5SSee Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ([92], 
pp46~47) and Directoraat-Generaal der Belastingen [30]. The 
AKW premium was terminated in 1988. It is now paid by the state. 
Persons older than 64 do not pay AOW and AWW premiums. 
(b) single persons, who are not classified in group 
(Vl); 
(c) persons, who are head of a one-parent  family, 
hut who are not classified in groups (IV), (V) 
or (Vl). 
The tax allowance amounts  to Dfl4568 in 1990. 
III Married and cohabit ing persons who receive the 
tax allowance of their partner. Their tax allowance 
now is Dfl9112 in 1990. 
IV Non-marr ied ,  non-cohabi t ing people who run a 
household with at least one child younger  than 
27 years old and no children over 26 years old. 
The tax allowance amounts  to Dfl8222 in 1990; 
V Non-marr ied ,  non-cohabi t ing people who have a 
paid job and who run a household with at least 
one child younger  than 12 years old. The tax 
allowance amounts  to Dfl8222 plus 6% of the 
labour  income (up to a maximum of Dfl3654) in 
1990. 
VI Single persons, aged 27 to 65 years old, with an 
income below Df135000 (in 1990). The tax 
allowance amounts  to Dfl5695 (in 1990). 
In contrast  to the past (when a partial transfer was 
possible), the complete tax allowance is now transferred 
to the partner. All extra allowances for working people 
have been abolished. 
The tax group classifications, the tax rates (for the 
period 1947 72 in an approximate  manner)  and the 
allowances have been built in N E D Y M A S .  When a 
person has passed the social security module (see 
below), his or her tax group is determined for the 
current year. 56 Taxes can only be determined at this 
point, because a person's  taxable income was not 
known until now. With reference to the other  tax- 
deductible items (like extraordinary charges, deduc- 
tion of  costs above the so-called 4% acquisition costs 
rule, commut ing  costs above the minimum deduction,  
various specific costs and gains for self-employed 
persons) we only consider the 4% acquisition costs 
rule and a fixed amount  for commut ing  costs. 57 An 
56 With the exclusion of married women up to 1973. Their income 
has been added to their husbands" income. 
57 Generally speaking, working people can always claim a reduction 
for costs which are necessary for the acquisition of an income on 
their taxable income. The reduction is 4% of the gross wage after 
deduction of the private pension premium and the deduction for 
civil servants at minimum. But the minimum deductible amount is 
limited downwards and upwards (Dfl200 and Dfl800 respectively 
in 1988). This regular 4% deduction is called the 4°/,, acquisition 
costs rule. If real acquisition costs are larger than these 4% or 
Dfl800 [in 1988) the real costs can be claimed. In this way, most 
employees have been treated correctly. From NCBS (1-116], 
p 144) it is known that 94% of the employees applied the 4% rule 
and consequently 6% claim more than 4%. Dfl200 was the figure 
for commuting costs in 1988. 
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Table 5. Derivation of the taxable income for an employee in 1986 (Dfl). 
a. Gross wage 
b. Private pension premium (5.1% of the gross wage after deduction of the franchise of 25 640) 
c. Income on which the employee insurances are levied (a)-(b) 
d. Premium ZFW, employers' part (4.8% of (c)) 
e. Premium WW (1.75% of (c)) 
f. Premium ZW (1% of (c)) 
g. Premium WAO (15.05% of (c) after deduction of the franchise of 23 751) 
h. Deductions - commuting costs 
- 4% acquisition costs rule (upper limit) 
i. Income on which the general insurances are levied ((c)+ (d)- (e)- (f)- (g)-(h)) 
j. Premiums AOW and AWW (12.7% of (i)) 













example of the determination of an employee's taxable 
income is shown in Table 5. 58 
Until 1990 this taxable income is reduced by claims 
on disablement allowances, allowances for the aged, 
tax deduction for children, the allowance for one- 
parent families, the allowance for working people, the 
extra allowance for working people and the allowance 
for self-employed persons. If the resulting amount  is 
less than the tax group allowance, no tax is levied and 
since 1984 the difference between both amounts is 
transferred to the partner, if present. If this amount  
is larger than the tax group allowance, this amount  
is reduced by the tax group allowance, and the tax 
rates are applied to this. From 1990 on the taxable 
income equals the income on which the general 
insurances are levied (in both cases item (i) in Table 5 
minus the tax allowances). 
The social security module 
After the determination of labour income, the social 
security module begins. The current definition of social 
security in its broad sense in the Netherlands, 
considers social security as the totality of legal 
measures which aim to guarantee continuity in a 
person's spending opportunities. 59 On the basis of this 
definition, we can divide social security into four 
components:  
(i) social insurances; 
(ii) pension insurances; 
(iii) other social provisions; and 
(iv) social benefits, directly paid by the employer. 
Social insurances are all legal arrangements which 
primarily aim to redistribute income between persons 
or social groups; the right to a benefit is based on the 
insurance concept. Voluntary insurances, for which 
participation depends on legalized entry require- 
58 The example is taken from Bolhuis ([13, p 133]). 
59 See Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid [88]. 
ments, are also considered social insurances. Pension 
insurances include all arrangements which aim to 
redistribute the income of persons over time. They 
are based on a labour relation. Pension insurances are 
financed by a capital reserve system. So, a relationship 
is created between the insured person and the pension 
fund. The insured person has a personal claim on the 
pension fund, so to speak. Other social provisions 
include all arrangements in the field of social security, 
where the benefits are financed directly by the state. 
No specific premiums are levied: these provisions are 
financed by public funds. Social benefits paid directly 
by the employer, refer to payments to (former) 
employees on the basis of a labour relation. 
The Dutch social security system was built up 
especially in the years after the Second World War. 
Its development can be called ambiguous. No choice 
has been made between the two types of social security 
systems which are generally distinguished, the Atlantic 
needs-based minimum approach and the Continental 
wage-related approach. 6° Two types of social insur- 
ance can therefore be seen in the Netherlands: general 
insurances and employee insurances. Both types of 
insurance are based on the pay-as-you-go system. 
The general insurances are Atlantic oriented, fiat rate 
benefits, covering all residents. Premiums have to be 
paid by all residents, they are proportional to income 
and have to be paid up to a fixed maximum income. 
The solidarity principle is the starting point, not the 
insurance principle. The following schemes in the 
Netherlands are current general insurances: AOW, 
AWW, AKW, AWBZ and AAW. Employee insur- 
ances only apply to employees in the private sector. 
The insurance or equivalence principle is the point of 
departure. These insurances are compulsory for these 
employees. The employee insurances are genuine 
insurances: on the one hand, premiums are a fixed 
proportion of the income (which can be seen as the 
insured risk), whereas on the other hand, benefits are 
60 See Veldkamp [147] and Muffels et al ([93], pp 2-3). 
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Table 6. The size distribution of the Dutch social security system (total benefits in million Dutch guilders) 
Type ! 950 1960 1970 1980 1987 
Social insurances 53 63 72 75 68 
General insurances ! 1 23 34 43 40 
Employee insurances 42 39 38 31 28 
Supplementary pensions 26 20 14 12 15 
Social provisions 11 9 8 12 13 
Direct payments 11 9 7 5 4 
Total as a % of NI 11 14 21 32 34 
Total benefits 1.9 5.6 24.4 101.8 132.3 
Sources." Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ([89], pp95 I01, [91], pp 136-140) and NCBS [99]. 
related to the (former) income. 61 Both are limited by 
a fixed maximum income. At the moment ,  the 
following employee insurances are in operation: ZW, 
WAO, N W W  and ZFW. 
Social provisions in the Netherlands are mainly 
intended to support  those who cannot provide for 
themselves. The following schemes can be considered 
as other social provisions: IOAW, TW, ABW and 
KKZ.  In the Netherlands a number of state arrange- 
ments exist for civil servants and employees in public 
firms. They are comparable to the employee insurances. 
Besides their duration, these arrangements differ in 
particular in the way the premiums are paid: they are 
paid by the state in its capacity as employer and 
employees are exempt from paying. The most impor- 
tant schemes are: WRO,  DSO, IZA, KTO.  
A large number  of pension provisions are available 
for both civil servants and private employees. The 
largest pension fund is the ABP. 
Table 6 gives information on the size of the Dutch 
social security system. This table is based on the broad 
definition of the Department  of Social Affairs. From 
this table, the important  role of the social security 
system in the income redistribution process is immedi- 
ately clear. At the moment  about  one-third of the 
Dutch net national income is redistributed in the form 
of social security benefits. If we also take account of 
fund raising, the percentage even exceeds 40% of 
national income. The main element is social insurances. 
These constitute about  two-thirds of total benefits. 
Both social provisions and supplementary pensions 
account for about 15%, whereas direct payments by 
the employer constitute no more than a few per cent 
of the total social security benefits. 
As we said before, the starting point for our analysis 
is the current definition of social security in its broad 
sense. However, information on some schemes is 
6~ However, these insurances cannot be seen as actuarial insurances, 
because premiums are not differentiated by the real risk of becoming 
unemployed or the real risk of becoming disabled. ZFW benefits 
are not related to income. This act regulates the provision of medical 
and surgical treatment or its compensation. 
lacking. We deal with the following social security 
arrangements in our analysis: 
(i) in the field of unemployment provisions: 
WW (1952-86)/NWW (1987-)/WWV (1965 86)/ 
WRO (1947-); 62 
(ii) in the field of long-term disability: AAW 
(1976-) WAO (1967-) / IP-ABP (1947-); 
(iii) in the field of sickness and short-term disability: 
ZW (1947-)/DSO (1947-); 
(iv) in the field of old age, widows and orphans: 
AOW (1957-)/AWW (1959-)/OP-ABP (1947-)/ 
WP-ABP (1947-)/WP-PS (1947-); 63 
(v) in the field of family allowances: KW (1947-62)/ 
KWR (1947-62)/KWL (1963-79)/KKZ (1963- 
79)/AKW (1963-)/KTO (1947-79); 
(vi) in the field of health costs: ZFB (1947-66)/ZFW 
(1967) /AWBZ (1968);64 
(vii) other provisions: ABW (1965) / IOAW (1987) /  
TW (1987);65 
(viii) other social security premiums: IW (1981).  
The extent to which the various social security schemes 
are treated in this paper can be derived from Table 7. 
In terms of total benefits, we cover 60.6% in 1950, 
77.2% in 1960 and 85-90% from 1970 onwards. The 
benefit side has not been covered 100% as a con- 
sequence of the lack of data in the field of supple- 
mentary pensions. Less than half the supplementary 
pensions are treated because we are not able to 
simulate all private pension benefits. The multiplicity 
of kinds of private pensions and the absence of a 
module for intrajob mobility in our microsimulation 
model makes it impossible for us to simulate these 
pensions in a realistic way at the moment.  Therefore 
only pensions under the ABP are included. 
From 1970 onwards, social insurance benefits have 
almost completely been included in the model. Up to 
62 The period considered is given in parentheses. 
63 WP-PS only premium payments. 
6,, Only premium payments. 
65 For the greater part, see the description below. 
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Table 7. Coverage of the various social security schemes (%). 
Type 1950 1960 1970 1980 1987 
Benefit side 
Social insurances 66.1 90.0 97.5 99.1 97.7 
Supplementary pensions 34.3 33.1 38.8 40.4 41.5 
Social provisions 82.7 70.8 66.8 68.7 78.1 
Direct payments 74.9 94.3 97.5 95.6 97.4 
Total 60.6 77.2 86.9 88.6 86.8 
Financing side 
Social insurances 56.3 82.1 90.5 91.6 96.4 
Supplementary pensions 100 100 100 100 100 
Total 71.7 86.5 92.1 92.8 97.0 
Sources." Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ([89], pp95-101; [91], pp 136-140). 
1967, the former Accident Insurance Act and the 
Disablement Act (in combination with the Temporary  
Act for Disabled Pension Receivers) existed, but 
they are not included in our model. These schemes 
accounted for a substantial proportion eg 16% in 1950 
and 9% in 1960. The Temporary  Act Old Age 
Pensions, which was operative until the introduction 
of the AOW in 1957, has not been included in 
NEDYMAS.  This law accounted for 16% in 1950. The 
remaining discrepancy between total benefits and 
benefits included in the model may be attributed back 
to the Voluntary Advanced Retirement scheme and 
insurance against the risk of unemployment due to 
weather conditions. Both are only a few per cent 
maximum. 
The other social provisions are covered for 70-80%. 
Not  included are arrangements for social work 
provision (WSW), arrangements for artists (BKR), 
special pensions for groups of war victims, and home 
care. The WSW formed 11% of the other social 
provisions in 1987 (the minimum), and 23% in 1970 
(the maximum). Home care ranged from 2 to 9%, 
special pensions from 4 to 9% and the BKR was about 
1% at most. 
Social benefits directly paid by the employer are 
almost completely covered. The only elements which 
are not included are the Voluntary Advanced Retire- 
ment for Civil Servants (about 2% in 1987) and the 
Breadwinner and Income Compensation for Soldiers 
(25% in 1950 to less than 1% in 1987). 
On the financing side, we can limit ourselves to 
social insurances and supplementary pensions. The 
other social provisions and benefits paid directly by 
the employer - ie the state - are both financed by 
public funds. The percentages equal the percentages 
for these schemes at the benefits side, augmented by 
the premiums for the compulsory ZFW,  the AWBZ 
and private pensions. The Accident Insurance Act 
and the Disablement Act (in combination with the 
Temporary  Act for Disablement Pension Receivers) 
are not included. This explains the somewhat lower 
percentages in 1950 and 1960. From about  1965 
onwards the financing side is covered for more than 
90% and even for 97% in 1987. 
The treatment of social security schemes has been 
shown in Figure 4. First the premiums for private and 
civil servant pensions and the deduction for civil 
servants are determined. This also gives us the gross 
wage. If this has been executed for all workers and we 
are in the year 1992 or later, via the net-net  and 
gross-gross coupling, the level of the different benefits, 
the maximum premium income for the general 
insurances and the maximum premium income for the 
employee insurances are calculated (see below). For 
the years 1991 and earlier, these amounts are known 
from NCBS [-99]. 66 Next, the claims for the General 
Old Age Pensions Act, the General Widows and 
Orphans Pensions Act, the widows' and orphans '  
pensions of the Civil Servants Pensions Fund, family 
allowances, the General Disablement Benefits Act, the 
Sickness Benefit Act, the Disablement Insurance Act, 
the disablement pensions of the Civil Servants Pensions 
Fund, the old age pensions of the Civil Servants 
Pensions Fund, the unemployment benefits of the Civil 
Servants Pensions Fund, the Unemployment  Insur- 
ance Act, the Unemployment  Provisions Act and the 
New Unemployment  Insurance Act are determined. 
If this is done for all persons, we can calculate 
the claims that also depend on the income of other 
household members: the Provision for Older and 
Partly Disabled Unemployed Employees, the Supple- 
mentary Benefits Act and the General Social Assistance 
Act. If we are in the year 1988 or later, we then 
have to calculate the premium percentages. Last, 
we can determine the premium payments for the 
Health Insurance Fund Act, the Sickness Benefit Act, 
66 Like all other data, unless mentioned otherwise. 
E C O N O M I C  M O D E L L I N G  July 1993 245 
Labour market, income.lormation and social security in NED YMAS. J.H.M. Nelissen 
Star t  a f t e r  labour  income 
i n d i v i d u i l s  deal t  wi th 
Write ind iv idua l  to f i le 
Execute ne t -ne t  and 
e s - - ~ g r o s s - g r o s s  coup l ing ,  
i f  year  ) 1992 
All i nd iv idua ls  deal t  with 




All i nd iv idua ls  deal t  with No k ' Write individual to file ,4 
Yes ~ Determine premium percen tages ,  i f  year  ) 1992 
All i nd iv idua ls  deal t  with 




~-Read one ind iv idua l  from f i le 
t ; 
Simulation of 
(1) private pension premiums 
(2) pension premiums civil s e rvan t s  
(3) deduct ion c iv i l  se rvan ts  
p- Read ind iv idua l  f rom f i le 
t 
Simulation of 
(g) benefi ts  from AOW, OP-ABP, AWW, 
WP-ABP, family allowances, AAW, 
WAO, IP-ABP, WRO, WW, WWV, NWW 
~ Read individual from file 
t ; 
Simulation of 
(5) benefits  TW, IOAW, ABW 
m-Read ind iv idua l  from f i le 
t ; 
SimuLation o f  
(6) premiums for  ZFW, ZW, WAO, WW, 
NWW, AOW, AWW, fami ly a l lowances,  
AAW and AWBZ 
Taxes 
Figure 4. An overview of the social security module. 
the Disablement Insurance Act, the Unemployment  
Insurance Act, the New Unemployment  Insurance 
Act, the General Old Age Pensions Act, the General 
Widows and Orphans Pensions Act, family allowances, 
the General Disablement Benefits Act and the General 
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act. At this point, all 
calculations for the social security module are executed 
and we go back to the labour market  and income 
formation module to calculate taxes. 
The social security benefits 
The General Old Age Pensions Act (AOW).  The 
AOW came into force on 1 January 1957. 67 The law 
provides for a compulsory insurance against the 
financial consequences of old age on reaching the age 
of 65 years. All residents in the Netherlands aged 15 
to 65 years are insured. 68 An AOW benefit can be 
claimed if a person is 65 years or older and has been 
insured. Until 1 April 1985, married women could not 
claim a benefit. Their benefit was linked to that of their 
~,7 The description is derived from NCBS [99] and Elseviers (E33], 
p l17 123). 
08 Non-residents who are governed by Dutch tax laws while they 
are employed in the Netherlands, are also insured for the AOW. 
However, residents who are insured for a foreign old age pension, 
because they are employed abroad, are not insured for the AOW. 
Persons who are no longer insured, have the possibility of 
continuing the AOW insurance which is only possible in 
combination with a voluntary AWW insurance by voluntary 
premium payments. 
husbands. The husband's  claim started on the first 
day of the month in which he became 65 years old. 
Exceptions existed for some specific groups. Since 
1 April 1985, both married women and men are 
independently entitled to an AOW benefit. 
Initially the AOW benefit was a relatively small 
amount.  It was raised to a social minimum on 
1 January 1965, so that a fixed minimum standard of 
living was guaranteed. In the early 1970s further 
structural increments took place and holiday allow- 
ances were added to the benefit. From 1976 the (net) 
AOW benefit for a married couple equalled the net 
minimum wage. A non-married individual now re- 
ceives a benefit which amounts to 70% of the benefit 
which a couple receives. 
Since 1 January 1987 new cases of non-married 
cohabiting people have been treated in the same way 
way as married persons. 69 A married person receives 
50% of the total benefit for married couples when he or 
she reaches the age of 65. On this same date, a special 
AOW benefit for one-parent families, receiving family 
allowances, was introduced. The benefit amounts to 
90% of the (100%) benefit for married couples. 
Between 1 January 1987 and 1 April 1988, an extra 
allowance which is independent of the income of the 
younger partner is paid if one of the partners receives 
an AOW benefit, and the other partner has not yet 
~,9 Relatives in the first degree (for example a parent and a child) 
are treated as non-cohabiting persons. 
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reached the age of 65 years. Since 1 April 1988, a 
pension of 70% of the net minimum wage is paid to 
a person eligible for the AOW, if his or her partner is 
younger than 65. The amount  of the extra allowance 
depends on the partner 's income if this partner is 59 
or younger. The extra allowance is made up to a 
maximum of 100% of the AOW benefit for married 
couples. This income dependency does not hold if one 
partner was eligible for the AOW benefit before 1 April 
1988. 
The AOW benefit is based on an insurance duration 
of 50 years (between the ages of 15 and 65). A number 
of temporary provisions are at work. For  example, 
people who were already 65 or older on 1 January 
1957 (when the AOW was introduced) received a 
benefit based on an insurance duration of 50 years. 
For persons who were already 15 but not yet 65 on 
this date, an analogous provision holds. If a person 
has no income in any year, but does meet the other 
requirements, he or she is also insured. Some temporary 
provisions for immigrants and emigrants also apply. 
If a person has not been insured for a year or has not 
paid the AOW premium due to carelessness, the AOW 
benefit is reduced. The reduction amounts to 1% for 
married people (and people treated in the same way) 
and 2% for non-married persons. 
In the case of death, the AOW benefit is paid up 
to and including two months after the month of death 
for married persons, and up to and including the 
month of death in the case of a non-married person. 
The General Widows and Orphans Pensions Act 
(AWW). The AWW came into force on 1 October 
1959. 70 It is a compulsory general insurance against 
the financial consequences of death of the insured 
husband (the widows' pension) or both wife and 
husband (the orphans'  pension). Recently, the Centrale 
Raad van Beroep (Court of Appeal) decided that men 
can - under the same conditions as women also 
claim an AWW benefit when their (insured) wife dies. 
As a consequence, widowers can claim an AWW 
benefit from 1 January 1988. The following therefore 
applies to men as well as women. 
The group of insured persons is exactly the same 
as for the AOW. Analogous temporary provisions are 
at work and a voluntary insurance is also possible 
here (but only in combination with a voluntary 
insurance for the AOW). In addition, some specific 
groups of widows and orphans living abroad can claim 
an AWW benefit. 
The AWW has four types of benefits. First, we have 
the high widows' pension for widows with at least one 
unmarried child younger than 18 living at home. The 
7o See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp 107-111 ). 
benefit equals the amount  a married couple receives 
from the AOW (and thus equals the net minimum 
wage since 1976). The high widows' pension ends if 
the widow no longer meets the conditions. If she meets 
the conditions for the low widows' pension, then her 
pension is transformed into this type of pension. If 
this is not the case, she can claim a temporary widows' 
pension. Second, we have the low widows' pension. If 
the widow cannot claim a high widows' pension, she 
may have the right to this type of widows' pension. 
This pension holds for widows who have at least one 
unmarried child, but no unmarried child younger than 
18 living at home; for widows who were 40 years or 
older or were disabled at the time of the death of their 
husband; and for other widows who were 35, but not 
yet 40 years old on the last day of the month in which 
their husband died and have or have had an own child 
who was married or had died before her husband died, 
assuming that the widow was already 35 years old at 
the time the child married or died. The benefit amounts 
to 70% of the AOW benefit for married couples. The 
low widows' pension ends when the widow no longer 
meets the conditions, unless she was already at least 
40 years old when her disablement ended or at least 
35 years old when her last child married or died. 
In these last two cases, her low widows' pension 
continues. If it ends, she can claim the temporary 
widows' benefit. In all other cases, the widow can 
claim the third type when her husband dies, the 
temporary widows' benefit. The duration is 19 months 
at the most and depends on age. The benefit is paid 
for six months at least. If the widow is 27 years or 
older, then the benefit period is increased by one 
month for each year she is older than 27 years at the 
time of being widowed, taking into account the 
maximum period of 19 months. The amount  of the 
benefit is also 70% of the AOW benefit for married 
couples. These three types of widows' benefits are 
always terminated in the month the widow reaches 
the age of 65 years. From that moment  on, she can 
claim an AOW benefit. If the widow remarries, the 
widows' benefit is terminated. 
The fourth and last type of AWW benefit is the 
orphans '  pension. It is paid to full orphans up to and 
including the age of 15 years old (without any 
limitation), to disabled full orphans aged 16 and 17 
years old, to full orphans aged 16 up to 27 years old, 
who are studying, and to full orphans in the same age 
category who run the household in which at least one 
other child can claim an orphans '  pension. The 
amount  depends on the orphan 's  age. 
Family allowances. The purpose of the various 
family allowances is to provide additional income to 
ensure the standard of living of children up to a certain 
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age. 71 Until January 1979 a parent received family 
allowances without further conditions (on the under- 
standing that he or she was insured) for children up 
to the age of 16 years. Since then, the age limit has been 
18 years. I f a  child is older, but disabled or running the 
houshold or a student (up to 1 October 1986) the 
parent receives family allowances if the child is 
younger than 27 years old and the child is largely 
supported by his or her parents. From 1963 on, a 
parent can receive twice or even three times a family 
benefit for one child under certain conditions; it is 
then said that the child counts for two and three 
children respectively. A child counts for two children 
if the child is younger than 16 years old, lives outside 
the parental home for reasons of education or sickness 
and is largely supported by his or her parents (that is 
to say for 50% or more), or if the child is 16 or 17 
years old, lives alone and is largely supported by his 
or her parents, or if the child is aged between 18 and 
27 years old, is studying (up to 1 October 1986) or 
running the household, and is largely supported by 
the parents. Up to 1 October 1986, children living 
outside the parental home, who were studying and 
aged between 18 and 27 years old, counted for three 
children if they were supported completely or almost 
completely (that is to say for 90% or more) by their 
parents. From 1 January 1983, unemployed school- 
leavers aged 21 years old or younger can claim family 
allowances for six months. 
The following family allowances acts have been 
incorporated in NEDYMAS:  the Family Allowances 
Act (KW) and the Benefit Receiving Persons Family 
Allowances Act (KWR), which both applied in the 
period 1947 62, the Wage Earners Family Allowances 
Act (KWL) and the Self-Employed Persons Family 
Allowances Act (KKZ),  which were both operative 
in the period 1963 79; the Civil Servants Family 
Allowances Provision (KTO), which was at work 
between 1947 and 1979; and the General Family 
Allowances Act (AKW), which has been in force since 
1963. 
The AKW provides family allowances from the first 
child on, from January 1980. Before that date, the 
AKW provided only family allowances for the third 
child and subsequent children (since 1963), and civil 
servants and teachers were excluded. These last two 
groups obtained no family allowances at all from the 
AKW. As a consequence of the extension in 1980, 
the KWL,  K K Z  and K T O  were abolished. From 
1 January 1979 on, the family allowance for the first 
child, if born after that date, was halved. Since 
1 January 1983, the allowance has only been halved 
if no other children are present in the household. From 
7J See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp 102 105). 
1982 on all family allowances were adjusted for the 
change in the price index figure of the consumption 
of employee families with two children, each half year. 
Since 1983 the benefit structure has been specified 
more and more. Among other things, the child's age, 
for example, now also determines the benefit. 
The K K Z  and KWL provided some groups of 
family allowances for the first two children between 1 
January 1963 and 1 January 1980. Self-employed 
persons received family allowances for their first two 
children if their income was below a certain level. The 
income level for the second child was somewhat above 
that for the first child. Up to 1 July 1978 the benefit 
equalled the KWL benefit. While the tax deduction 
for children continued to exist for self-employed 
persons, while this deduction was abolished for other 
persons, the K K Z  benefits have been below the K W L  
benefits since that date. The K W L  provided family 
allowances for the first and second children of 
employees and persons who were on the same footing 
as employees. The last category almost coincides with 
persons who received a benefit from the ZW, the 
WAO, the AWW, the WWV, the WW, the AOW or 
the AWW. Civil servants and teachers were covered 
by the KTO.  Benefits and premium payments were in 
accordance with the K W L  and AKW. The group of 
insured persons for the KW is about the same as for 
the ZW (see that subsection). However, no income 
limit was in force. Civil servants were again excluded. 
The possibility of counting one child for two or three 
children did not yet exist. No benefits were paid for 
children aged 16 years or older, who were running the 
household. Family allowances were provided for each 
employee's working day and for each day for which 
the employee received a benefit from a social security 
act, without having worked. The KWR provided 
family allowances to persons receiving a benefit from 
the Disablement Act, the AOW or the AWW. The 
regulation was in accordance with the KW. Benefits 
were, however, paid for each month instead of each 
working day. 
The General Disablement Benefits Act (AA W). The 
AAW took effect on 1 October 1976. 72 It is an 
insurance against the financial consequences of long- 
term disability. All residents up to the age of 65 and 
some groups of non-residents are compulsorily insured 
for the AAW. A benefit can be received from the age 
of 17. To receive a benefit at that age, a person has to 
have been disabled for at least one year and to be 
insured. If an individual becomes disabled after his or 
her 17th birthday, he or she receives a benefit if 
72 See NCBS [99], Elseviers ([33], pp40,  56 68) and Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid [90], p 19). 
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insured, if the disability has already existed for at least 
one year and if at the moment of becoming disabled, 
the person earned an income from or relating to 
labour, which exceeded a fixed minimal amount. 73 In 
all cases a person has to be disabled at least 25%. 
Married women did not have an independent right to 
a benefit until 1 January 1980, under the restriction 
that they became disabled on or after 1 October 1975. 
Before that time, married women could only claim a 
benefit if they were breadwinners. 74 
The level of the AAW benefit is determined by the 
AAW basis. Up to 1980 two bases existed: 
(i) high AAW basis for married men and for non- 
married persons who had to support at least one 
child, aged 17 or under; 
(ii) low AAW basis (which amounts to about 70% of 
the high AAW-basis, and as a consequence, from 
1978 on, 70% of the net minimum wage) for all 
other rightful claimants. 
From 1980 up to and including 1986, four AAW bases 
existed. The general AAW basis equals 70% of the net 
minimum wage, with the exception of persons up to 
the age of 21 years, for whom in accordance with the 
minimum youth wages, lower amounts apply. This 
general AAW basis applies to everybody, unless 
another AAW basis has been declared. The middle 
AAW basis applies to married persons and to 
non-married persons who take care of children 
younger than 18, on the condition that the insured 
person's income, augmented by his or her partner's 
income (if present) amounts to at least 15% and at 
most 30% of the maximum AAW basis on the first 
day at which AAW benefit can be claimed. In this case 
the AAW benefit amounts to 85% of the net minimum 
wage. If the aforementioned sum of incomes amounts 
to less than 15% of the maximum AAW basis, then 
a person receives the maximum AAW basis, which 
equals the net minimum wage. Last there is an 
individual AAW basis. This AAW basis applies to 
persons who worked part-time during the year 
preceding the day they became disabled and whose 
benefit would amount to more than 80% of their 
income during that year. They receive 80% of this 
income. 
From 1 January 1987 only one AAW basis has been 
in operation: the general AAW basis. Everyone 
receives 70% of the net minimum wage. If necessary, 
73 On this last condition, several exceptions exist, among others for 
students, unmarried persons and self-employed persons. 
74A verdict of the Centrale Raad van Beroep has laid these 
limitations for married women open to criticism. The consequences 
are not fully clear at the moment.  In any case, women who were 
already disabled before 1979 can claim a benefit, if they were not 
breadwinners. 
a person can appeal to the Supplementary Benefits 
Act. A temporary provision applies to one-parent 
families. If they received a higher benefit on 31 
December 1986, a supplementary benefit is paid of up 
to 100% of the net minimum wage. For  persons up 
to the age of 23 years, the amounts in accordance with 
the minimum youth wages remain in force. 
In addition to the AAW basis, the AAW benefit is 
determined by the degree of disablement. The AAW 
benefit amounts to the AAW basis times a proportion, 
which depends on the degree of disablement. The 
benefit is terminated if the degree of disability drops 
below 25%, or when a person reaches the age of 65 
years, or dies, or - being a widow if she can claim 
an AWW benefit. If a person who receives an AAW 
benefit dies, his or her next of kin receives a death 
benefit under certain conditions. The death benefit 
equals the AAW benefit during the remaining part of 
the month in which the person died plus two extra 
months. 
The AAW also has the possibility of creating 
provisions which serve for maintenance, recuperation 
or benefit for disability, or for improvement in living 
conditions. People who do not receive a benefit, but 
are insured, can also claim this kind of provision. 
The Disablement Insurance Act (WAO). The WAO 
became operative on 1 July 1967. 75 The law provided 
for the financial consequences of long-term disable- 
ment for employees up to the moment at which the 
AAW came into force. Since that time - 1 October 
1976 both the AAW and the WAO provide for the 
financial consequences of disablement. For  employees 
who became disabled after 1 October 1976, the WAO 
is a supplementary benefit. All persons who are insured 
for the ZW and persons who receive a WWV benefit 
are insured. Employees above the age of 65 are not 
insured. This also holds for persons who participate 
in the Civil Servants Pensions fund. 
All employees who have been disabled for 52 weeks 
and whose degree of disablement is at least 15% can 
claim a WAO benefit. The level of the benefit depends 
on the degree of disablement and on the daily wage. 
The daily wage is the wage earned on average per day 
in the profession practised in the year before becoming 
disabled. The level of the benefit is maximized by the 
fact that a maximum daily wage exists for the WAO. 
Nowadays, the benefit is at most 70% of the daily 
wage. From 1969 up to 1987 breadwinners with a 
degree of disability of more than 80% also had a 
7s See NCBS [99], Elseviers ([33], pp68-70)  and Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid [90], pp 20-22). 
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minimum benefit, v6 The benefit is index-linked with 
the wages. 
The benefit ends if the degree of disablement drops 
below 15%, if the benefit recipient turns 65 years or 
if he or she dies. The revision of the social security 
system in 1987 also implied a re-examination of 
disabled persons aged 35 or less. Persons who become 
disabled after 1 January 1987 and are less than 80% 
disabled, are considered to be unemployed to the 
extent that they are not disabled. 7v This also holds 
for those re-examined disabled persons whose degree 
of disablement is readjusted downwards. A person can 
claim an N W W  benefit if he or she worked for at least 
half a year before becoming disabled. For any 
additional claims after that period, see under the 
NWW. A person then has a right to a partial 
Continued Benefit in view of the N W W  for one year 
maximum. Later, additional benefit from the IOAW 
can be claimed. The level of the partial Continued 
Benefit from the NWW and the AAW/WAO benefit 
amounts to 70% of the last earned wage income (which 
is index linked). It is also possible to claim an 
additional benefit from the TW. 
Until the AAW became operative, the WAO also 
had provisions which served for maintenance, re- 
cuperation or benefit for disability or for improving 
living conditions. If a person who receives a WAO 
benefit dies, his or her next of kin receives a death 
benefit under certain conditions. The death benefit 
equals the WAO benefit during the remaining part of 
the month in which the person died plus two extra 
months. 
The Sickness Benefit Act (ZW)  and Sickness Payments 
for  Civil Servants (DSO). The ZW became operative 
in 1930 and is the oldest provision discussed. 7s Its goal 
is to insure employees up to the age of 65 against the 
financial consequences of not being able to work as a 
result of disability, accident (from 1 July 1967 on) or 
sickness. 79 (Sickness also includes pregnancy and 
childbirth.) For the concept of the employee, see 
Elseviers ([33], p 16). As a consequence, unemployed 
persons who receive a WW or an N W W  benefit have 
to claim a ZW benefit in case of sickness. Civil servants 
cannot claim a ZW benefit. For them, the DSO is 
V6From 1987 on, the minimum daily wage for this group is 
guaranteed by the Supplementary Benefits Act. 
vv Before that time, the possibility existed to increase the degree of 
disability if labour market circumstances were bad, the so-called 
verdisconterin.q. 
7s See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp49-56). 
79 Before 1 July 1967, the financial consequences of accidents were 
covered by the Accident Insurance Act and those of disablement 
by the Disablement Act or the Temporary Act for Disablement 
Pension Receivers. We will not report on these acts for lack of 
sufficient data. 
operative. Before I July 1967, a ZW benefit could only 
be claimed if income was below a fixed upper limit, 
the so-called maximum wage limit. 
The benefit amounted to 80% of the daily wage up 
to 1 May 1985, 75% between I May 1985 and 1 
January 1986 and 70% afterwards. From 1969 up to 
1987 a minimum wage guarantee existed during the 
first six weeks of sickness, on the condition that the 
individual was married or took care of a child aged 
17 or younger, and that his or her income, augmented 
by the partner's income, amounted to less than 93.75% 
of the minimum wage. From 1 January 1987, a person 
has to claim a benefit from the TW in this case. The 
benefit is limited by the maximum premium income. 
The benefit starts the third day after the day the 
sickness (or disablement or accident) took place. The 
maximum benefit duration is one year. After that year 
a person falls under the WAO or AAW or the 
disablement pension of the Civil Servants Pensions 
Fund. Before the introduction of the WAO, the 
Disablement Act or the Temporary Act or Disable- 
ment Pension Receivers applied. 
Employers are allowed to give a supplement to the 
ZW benefit of up to 100% of the daily wage and to 
pay the first two days which are not paid by the ZW. 
This supplement is called the supplementary benefit. 
If a person who receives a ZW benefit dies, his or 
her next of kin receives a death benefit from the ZW 
under certain conditions. The death benefit amounts 
to 100% of the daily wage during the remaining part 
of the month in which the person died, plus two extra 
months. The ZW considers pregnancy and childbirth 
benefits to be a specific element of the sickness benefit. 
Generally, a benefit which equals the daily wage is 
paid during six weeks before childbirth and six weeks 
after childbirth. The ZW allows for the possibility of 
a part-time resumption of work. The ZW benefit will 
then be reduced for that part. As above, civil servants 
have a settlement of their own: the DSO. The DSO 
is more or less in accordance with the ZW. However, 
the benefit is 100% and the first two days of sickness 
are also paid and its maximum duration is 1.5 years 
(as opposed to 1 year). 
The Unemployment Insurance Act (WW).  The WW, 
which came into force on 1 July 1952, insured 
employees against the financial consequences of 
involuntary unemployment, s° On 1 January [987, the 
WW was incorporated into the NWW. All employees 
up to 65 years old were insured. Before 1957 people 
aged 65 years and older were also insured. Civil 
servants were excluded. Separate settlements existed 
s0 See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp77-91). 
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for this category. Until 1965 a maximum wage limit 
existed, which was identical to the maximum wage 
limit for the ZW. 
The WW consisted of three parts: the unemployment 
insurance for persons belonging to a particular branch 
of industry, 81 the general unemployment insurance for 
employees, and the insurance against the risk of 
unemployment due to weather conditions. 
The first insurance was for employees who belonged 
to a given branch of industry. During their unemploy- 
ment period, they were included in the labour pool of 
that sector. A person was entitled to a benefit from 
this type of insurance if he or she had been employed 
by employers who were members of the trade 
association in question for at least 130 days during 
the previous 12 months. The maximum benefit period 
was eight weeks in a period of 12 months. Until 
1 January 1985 the level of the benefit was 80% of the 
employee's daily wage. From that date on, the benefit 
amounted to 70% of the daily wage. As was the case 
for the WAO and ZW a maximum benefit existed 
which was determined by the benefit percentage and 
the maximum premium income. Since 1969 a minimum 
benefit level has existed for breadwinners. 
The second insurance, the general unemployment 
insurance for employees, held for those employees who 
were not eligible for the first type of unemployment 
insurance (because they did not belong to the labour 
pool of that sector), and for those unemployed persons 
whose maximum period for the first type of unemploy- 
ment insurance had expired, or who had already used 
their eight weeks during a preceding period of 
unemployment. Here also an employee had to be 
employed during at least 130 days during the previous 
12 months. The maximum duration was 26 weeks a 
year; this figure was reduced by the period for which 
the first type of insurance benefit was received. 
The level equalled that for the first type. 
Unemployment due to weather conditions was a 
particular type of unemployment, which differed 
between sectors of industry. A recipient had to have 
paid a premium for at least 120 days during the 
previous 12 months in order to receive a benefit. The 
benefit amounted to 110% of the hourly wage rate. 
Recipients of a WW benefit were insured for the 
ZW. In case of sickness, the unemployment benefit 
was replaced by a ZW benefit. I fa  person who received 
a WW benefit died, his or her next of kin received a 
death benefit under certain conditions from the ZW. 
The death benefit equalled the WW benefit during the 
remaining part of the month in which the person died 
plus two extra months. 
In March 1974 a settlement for supplementary 
payments to wage income was introduced. If a person 
accepted a job with a lower income, he or she received 
a supplementary payment up to this income level. 
The Unemployment Provisions Act (WWV) .  The 
WWV was in force between 1965 and 1987. 82 When 
an employee (no longer) had a claim on the WW, he 
or she could be eligible for a WWV benefit. To claim 
a WWV benefit an employee had to be employed at 
least during the last six weeks before being un- 
employed or during 130 days in the year previous to 
the time of becoming unemployed. The benefit dura- 
tion was two years in the first instance. If an employee 
reached the age of 60 years after these two years, WWV 
benefit was prolonged up to the retirement age of 
65 years. 
From 22 June 1983 onwards, young people up to 
the age of 23 had to have been employed for at least 
130 weeks in the three years preceding their un- 
employment. Their benefit duration was limited to one 
year at most. Since 1 May 1985 benefit duration 
depended on age. Persons up to 23 could claim a 
benefit for six months at most, persons aged 23 to 30 
for one year, persons aged 30 to 35 for 18 months and 
older people for two years. If a person had been 
employed for 4.5 years during the previous six years, 
six months were added to the period. If a person had 
reached the age of 60 years at the end of the benefit 
period, the WWV benefit was prolonged up to the age 
of 65 years, but the level of the benefit was limited to 
the net minimum wage for breadwinners and to 70% 
of the net minimum wage for others. 
The benefit amounted to 75% of the daily wage 
until 1 January 1985 and 70% after this year up to 
the maximum premium income. From 3 November 
1969 a minimum daily wage was in force for bread- 
winners. The settlement for supplementary payments 
to wage income - if an employee accepted a job with 
a lower income - was also applied in the WWV. 
Married women could only claim a benefit from 1 
October 1976. Up to 24 December 1984, married 
women only received a benefit if they were bread- 
winners. Ira person died, his or her next of kin received 
a death benefit from the ZW under certain conditions. 
The death benefit equalled the WWV benefit during 
the remaining part of the month in which the person 
died plus two extra months. 
When the NWW became operative, the WWV was 
abrogated. 
The New Unemployment Insurance Act (NWW).  On 
1 January 1987, the WW and the WWV were replaced 
~1 In Dutch, the wacht.qeldverzekering. 82 See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp91-101). 
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by the NWW. 83 The group of insured persons did not 
change. The main difference between the N W W  and 
its predecessors is the dependence of the duration of 
the benefit on the number of years an employee has 
worked before becoming unemployed. In addition, the 
N W W  has the possibility of voluntary insurance for, 
among others, development workers, employees who 
are employed abroad by a Dutch employer and 
housekeepers who are not insured compulsorily. The 
minimum benefit for breadwinners is abolished and 
replaced by the TW. The level of the benefit amounts  
to 70% of the daily wage and is limited by the 
maximum premium income. 
Persons who become unemployed on or after 1 
January 1987 are entitled to an N W W  benefit if they 
were employed for at least 26 weeks in the year 
preceding the time of unemployment.  In that case 
benefit can be claimed for half a year. To be eligible 
for a benefit over a longer period, a person has to be 
employed for three years in the five years preceding 
the time of becoming unemployed. I fa  person does not 
work in order to take care of children up to the age of 6 
these years are considered as years worked; if the 
children are aged 6 to 12, half of these years count as 
years worked. Persons up to the age of 23 can only 
receive a benefit for longer than a half year, if they 
were employed for five years without interruption 
before they became unemployed. In that case their 
benefit is prolonged by three months. The extra 
duration of the N W W  benefit for persons aged 23 and 
older (who have been employed for three years during 
the last five years) depends on their labour history. 
Labour history has been defined as the individual's 
age minus 23 years plus the number  of years the 
individual was employed during the previous five 
years. If the labour history is between five and ten 
years, the benefit duration is prolonged by three 
months, and the total duration is consequently nine 
months. If the labour history is 10 to 15 years, the 
extra duration is a half year. In case of labour histories 
of 15 to 20 years, 20 to 25 years, 25 to 30 years, 30 
to 35 years and 35 to 40 years, the extra duration 
amounts to one year, eighteen months, two years, two 
and a half years and three and a half years respectively. 
If the labour history is longer than 40 years, then the 
extra duration is four and a half years. 
When the N W W  benefit ends and a person meets 
the requirement of having been employed for three 
years (five years for persons up to the age of 23) during 
the last five years before unemployment,  and a person 
is still unemployed, Continued Benefit under the 
N W W  can be claimed for a year. The Continued 
Benefit amounts to 70% of the minimum wage. The 
partner 's income, if there is any does not affect the 
benefit. If a person is 57.5 years or older when the 
Continued Benefit starts, this Continued Benefit can 
be claimed up to the age of 65. If the continued Benefit 
under the N W W  ends and the individual is still 
unemployed, he or she is normally entitled to the 
Governmental  Group  Provision for the Unemployed, 
the RWW. This does not hold for persons who received 
a Continued Benefit and were already 50 years or 
older when they became unemployed and for persons 
who did not receive a Continued Benefit, but were 
already 57.5 years or older when they stopped working. 
These two groups can claim an IOAW benefit. 
Persons receiving a WW or WWV benefit on 
31 December 1986 cannot claim a Continued Benefit 
under the NWW. However, if their WW or WWV 
benefit was more than 70% of their last earned wage 
income (for example as a consequence of the provi- 
sions for breadwinners), this higher benefit is pro- 
longed during the N W W  period. 
If a person who receives an N W W  benefit dies, his 
or her next of kin receives a death benefit from the ZW 
under certain conditions. The death benefit equals the 
N W W  benefit during the remaining part  of the month 
in which the person died plus two extra months. 
The Provision for Older and Partly Disabled Unemployed 
Employees (IOAW). The IOAW took effect on 
I January 1987. 84 This provision is aimed at two 
groups of former employees. First, it is an extra 
provision for older long-serving unemployed em- 
ployees, who have already received an N W W  benefit 
(including Continued Benefits) for the maximum 
period and who were at least 50 on their first day of 
unemployment.  If individuals are aged 57.5 years or 
older, they will only receive an IOAW benefit if they 
were employed for less than three years during the five 
years before they became unemployed. If they were 
unemployed for three years or more during these five 
years, they keep the Continued Benefits under the 
N W W  until they reach the age of 65. Persons aged 
between 50 and 57.5 years at the time they become 
unemployed enter the IOAW when the Continued 
Benefits ends. As a temporary provision, people who 
were aged between 47.5 and 50 receive an IOAW 
benefit when their N W W  expires. Second, the IOAW 
covers partly disabled employees who are unemployed 
for the non-disabled portion, irrespective of age. These 
people will receive an IOAW benefit when the N W W  
benefit (the Continued Benefits included) has ended. 
Under the IOAW an individual is entitled to a(n) 
s3 See Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ([90], 
pp4  5 ,8  11,13 18). 
84See Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ([90], 
pp8,  10, 16, 25-26). 
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(additional) benefit up to the level of the social 
minimum. An individual only receives the benefit if 
the sum of his or her labour income plus the partner's 
labour income is below the social minimum. For the 
first two years 30% of own labour income and 
partner's labour income is exempt, but the exempt 
amount is limited to 15% of the social minimum. The 
advantage of the IOAW in comparison with the ABW 
- under which other long-serving employed persons 
fall - is that property is not taken into consideration. 
The Supplementary Benefits Act (TW). The TW 
supplements NWW benefit, WAO benefit, AAW 
benefit and ZW benefit to the social minimum, but 
never above the last earned wage. 85 All additional 
income, including the partner's income, is taken into 
consideration, excluding property. Part of the labour 
income is exempt for two years, unless the person 
was 57.5 years or older at the time of becoming un- 
employed. In the latter case, the exemption has no 
maximum period. The exemption is 100% for incomes 
up to a sum of 5% of the minimum wage. Between 5 
and 15% of the minimum wage, 30% of the income 
is exempt. If a person dies, a death benefit under the 
ZW is received by the heir, analogously with, for 
example, the NWW. 
The General Social Assistance Act (ABW). The 
ABW, which took effect on 1 January 1965, obliges 
the state to provide financial support to every resident 
who ends up in such a situation that he or she has 
insufficient means to meet the necessary costs of 
living, a6 An ABW benefit is only received as a last 
resort. ABW is therefore the final safety net of the 
Dutch social security system. 
Conditions of benefit receipt do exist. It is assumed 
that each individual is responsible for his or her own 
livelihood. Unemployed persons and school-leavers 
therefore have an obligation to look for an appropriate 
job in order to be eligible for an ABW benefit, unless 
medical, social or other reasons make it impossible to 
do so. As a consequence, a recipient has to be 
registered at the Regional Labour Exchange. If this is 
not the case, ABW benefit can be reduced or even be 
terminated. 
The level of the ABW benefit is determined by the 
concept of 'necessary costs of living'. The benefit, 
based on this concept, is fixed for individuals or for 
specific groups. Recipients can be divided into three 
groups: National Group Regulations, assistance for 
8SSee Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid ([90], 
p26). 
86 See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp203-215). 
people living at home and assistance for persons not 
living at home. 
The group-oriented treatment of benefit recipients 
is regulated in the National Group Regulations. At the 
moment, the following National Group Regulations 
apply: 
(i) the National Group Regulation War Victims 
1940-45; 
(ii) the National Group Regulation Repatriates; 
(iii) the National Group Regulation Amboinese; 
(iv) the National Group Regulation Unemployed 
Persons; 
(v) the National Group Regulation Self-Employed 
Persons; 
(vi) the National Group Regulation Homeless 
Persons; 
(vii) the National Group Regulation Deduction Old 
Age Provisions for Special Groups; 
(viii) the National Group Regulation Elderly Self- 
Employed Persons. 
Two pieces of legislation apply that have an additional 
purpose and cannot be fully considered to be National 
Group regulations: the Decree to Employers of Inland 
Navigation and the Decree to Caravan-Dwellers. 
From 1 July 1974, general rules for the determination 
of the level of the benefit are given on the basis of the 
Decree National Standards Public Assistance. Before 
that time, no unequivocal interpretation of the concept 
of necessary costs of living existed and the level of the 
benefit differed from place to place. The decree does 
not hold for the National Group Regulation War 
Victims 1940~5, the National Group Regulation 
Amboinese and the National Group Regulation 
Homeless Persons. A specific benefit structure applies 
for these groups. The benefits, fixed in view of the 
Decree National Standards Public Assistance also 
hold for the assistance for persons living at home. The 
net minimum wage is the standard. Married and 
cohabiting couples receive 100% of the net minimum 
wage. One-parent families receive 90% and single 
persons above the age of 22 receive 70%. Single 
persons up to the age of 23 receive 70% of the 
minimum youth wages. If a person is 20 or younger 
and living in the parental home, he or she receives an 
adjusted (lower) benefit. Single people who share a 
household, and are not living in a consensual union, 
receive a reduction in their benefit. 87 
The Decree also regulates the extent to which the 
benefit is reduced by own income and property. For 
this, the household is the central unit, not the 
person who receives the benefit. The ABW has the 
87 In Dutch voordeurdelers ([33)], pp 129-145). 
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option of providing costs which exceed the current 
cost of living. This is called Incidental Assistance. 
The benefits for persons not living at home are 
actually a way of indirect financing of social or medical 
services. The benefit has three components:  costs of 
necessary nursing and medical attendance, a premium 
for the health insurances and an amount  for personal 
expenditure. 
The Health Insurance Act (ZFW). 8a The Z F W  is the 
substitute for the Decree on the Health Insurance and 
the Health Insurance Act for the Aged. The ZFW be- 
came operative on 1 January 1966. As a consequence, 
the compulsory sickness fund insurance, the voluntary 
sickness fund insurance and the sickness fund insur- 
ance for the aged were combined in one act. The ZFW 
regulates the provision of medical and surgical treat- 
ment (or its compensation). Compulsorily insured 
persons are insured by law. Up to 1987 the ZFW 
distinguished between four types of insurance: the 
three types discussed above and additional insurance. 
Voluntary insurance and insurance for the aged were 
abolished in 1987. About 65% of the Dutch population 
is covered by the ZFW. 
Compulsorily insured persons for the ZW and a 
number of persons who are put on the same footing 
- like persons who receive a WAO benefit are also 
compulsorily insured for the ZFW, on condition that 
their income is below the maximum wage threshold 
that obtains for the ZFW. The comparable income 
for people receiving a WW benefit and for disabled 
persons is the income on the basis of which their benefit 
has been determined. The compulsory insurance also 
holds for people receiving a WWV benefit or a benefit 
from the National Group  Regulation Unemployed 
Persons. The ZFW also insures family members under 
certain conditions: spouses and children up to 16 (27 
if disabled or until 1987 - students) and living in 
the same household as the directly insured person. 
From 1 January 1988, unmarried cohabiting persons 
are treated as married couples. From 1987 on, a person 
remains compulsory insured if he or she reaches the 
age of 65, whereas before 1987 this was not the case. 
If a person was not been compulsorily insured and 
income was below the wage threshold, such a person 
could insure him or herself voluntarily for the ZFW 
up to 1987. The insurance for the aged offered aged 
persons the possibility of joining the ZFW if their 
income was below a certain income limit (which was 
considerably lower than the above-mentioned wage 
threshold), for a limited premium. Aged persons with 
an income between the two limits, were allowed to 
s8 See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp 129-145). 
enter the voluntary insurance. The additional insur- 
ance offered the possibility of insuring against risks 
which were not (completely) covered by the sickness 
fund. 
The General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act 
(AWBZ). The AWBZ is an insurance against the 
financial consequences of special health costs arising 
from the need for long-term medical attendance, 
which generally are not covered by the ZFW and 
private health insurances. 89 The AWBZ is a general 
nationwide insurance. All residents are insured and no 
age limits are in force. Like the ZFW, the AWBZ is 
characterized by provisions in kind. The AWBZ came 
into operation in 1968. Its main purpose was to bear 
the heavy burden, which is often a consequence of a 
long illness, such as long-stay care in a nursing home 
or a home for mentally or physically handicapped 
persons. Subsequently, other types of care, with a less 
severe financial burden, such as aid by the Regional 
institutions for Ambulant Mental Health Services, 9° 
were included in the AWBZ. 
The AWBZ can be considered complementary to 
the ZFW. Generally, the costs for maintenance in 
hospitals, institutions and so on are reimbursed by 
the Z F W  or private health insurance companies 
during the first year, after which the costs are borne 
by the AWBZ. The recipient has to pay a part of the 
costs for some facilities. These contributions have 
depended on income since 1 January 1983. 
The Civil Servants Unemployment Benefit ( WRO). A 
number of types of benefit exist for the civil servant 
who is dismissed and therefore becomes unemployed. 
The kind of benefit received depends on the nature 
and the length of the contract, the reason for the 
dismissal and so on. We limit ourselves to the central 
issues of the Decree Civil Servants Unemployment  
Benefits 1959 and the Civil Servants Unemployment  
Benefit Provision 1966. 91 Persons working under a 
contract for six months or less are not considered as 
civil servants, but as employees. They receive a WW 
benefit or a WWV benefit or a N W W  benefit. 
A civil servant with a permanent appointment can 
claim a benefit from the Decree Civil Servants 
Unemployment  Benefits 1959 if he or she has been 
dismissed for reasons of discontinuance of the position, 
for reasons of reorganization, for reasons of strong 
objections against a transfer, for reasons of apparent 
impossibility of replacement after returning from fixed 
s9 See NCBS [99] and Elseviers ([33], pp 145-153). 
9o RIAGG's  in Dutch. 
9J Rijkswachtgeldbesluit 1959 and Uitkeringsregeling 1966 respec- 
tively. 
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types of special leave with a long duration or 
non-activity, or for reasons of incapacity to occupy 
the position (not including medical grounds). 
If the civil servant only had a temporary appoint- 
ment, he or she can also claim a benefit from the 
Decree Civil Servants Unemployment Benefits 1959, 
if he or she was dismissed for the reasons given above, 
with the exclusion of the last one. If he or she was 
dismissed for other reasons, the civil servant can claim 
a benefit from the Civil Servants Unemployment 
Benefit Provision 1966. 
The duration of the benefit under the Decree Civil 
Servants Unemployment Benefits 1959 depends on the 
age and the term of service on and up to the day of 
dismissal. The duration is three months at minimum. 
Up to the age of 21, these three months are increased 
by 18% of the term of service. The percentage is then 
increased by 1.5% for each year of age above 20. If 
age plus term of service amounts to more than 60 
years and the term of service is 10 years, at minimum, 
then the benefit lasts until the month in which the 
recipient is 65. 
Until 1 January 1985, the benefit amounted to 100% 
of the salary on the day of dismissal for the first three 
months. After the first three months the benefit was 
reduced to 90% for nine months and thereafter to 
80%. From 1985 on the percentages decreased by 10 
percentage points. As a consequence of the pre-tax 
decline of the salaries by 3% on 1 January 1984, an 
extra allowance of 3% was added to the benefit for a 
further five years. 
The Civil Servants Unemployment Benefit Provision 
1966 distinguishes between long- and short-term 
benefits. A civil servant can claim a long-term benefit 
if his or her term of service has been for at least three 
years. If the term of service has been interrupted for 
one month or longer, the claim expires. A term of 
service which has been used for a benefit once has to 
start again. The duration of the benefit is for one-sixth 
part of the term of service for a maximum of six 
months. The duration of the benefit is prolonged by 
six months if the term of service amounts to more than 
10 years and the sum of age and term of service 
amounts to at least 60 years. During the first two 
months, the level of the benefit equals 90% of the last 
earned salary, the following two months to 80% and 
for the rest of the period it is 70%. The short-term 
benefit under the Civil Servants Unemployment 
Benefit Provision 1966 has a duration of six months 
and amounts to 70% of the last earned salary. In both 
types of benefit under the Civil Servants Unemploy- 
ment Benefit Provision 1966, an extra allowance of 
3% is also given from 1 January 1984. 
For all benefits under the Decree Civil Servants 
Unemployment Benefits 1959 and the Civil Servants 
Unemployment Benefit Provision 1966 it holds that 
if a person receives income from sources which have 
arisen after unemployment benefit is reduced for that 
part of the income which - together with the benefit - 
exceeds the former salary. The benefits are financed 
by public funds. 
Pension provisions for  civil servants. Civil servants 
receive additional provisions for pensions such as 
those for old age, disability, widowhood, widower- 
hood and orphanhood. All these pensions are adminis- 
tered by the Civil Servants Pensions Fund (ABP). 
Persons who became civil servants after 1965 have to 
earn a fixed minimum salary before they are included 
in the ABP. If people receive a benefit under the 
settlements treated under the WRO, the benefit period 
counts for the pension rights. In the case of early 
retirement, this period counts for a half, whereas in 
the case of disability the period counts for the 
proportion for which a person was disabled. 
A person receives an old age pension (OP-ABP) on 
reaching the age of 65. The level of the old age pension 
is determined by the term of service, the rate and the 
so-called middle sum. For the calculation of the 
pension, 40 years of service is the maximum which is 
taken into consideration. The rate is the proportion 
by which the term of service is multiplied. Generally, 
the rate is 1.75%. A term of service of 40 years or 
more therefore generates an old age pension of 70%. 
The resulting percentage is multiplied by the middle 
sum. By and large the middle sum equals the average 
salary during the two last but one calendar years 
before retirement or discharge. The middle sum is 
indexed. While civil servants also receive an AOW 
benefit, this benefit is built in to the civil servant's 
pension. For each year of the term of service, 2% of 
the AOW benefit is built in. After a term of service of 
40 years, this implies that 80% of the AOW benefit 
is considered to form part of the civil servant's pension 
and he or she receives, on top of the ABP pension, 
20% of the AOW benefit. 
The civil servant who is dismissed for reasons of 
continual sickness or incapacity can claim a disability 
pension under the ABP (IP-ABP). The calculation of 
the level of the benefit is analogous to the old age 
pension: the term of service times the rate times the 
middle sum. This amount is compared with the 
amount which results from multiplying the middle sum 
with a proportion which depends on the degree of 
disability. The largest of the amounts will be paid as 
a disability pension. In view of the salary reduction 
on 1 January 1984, an extra allowance has been paid 
since that time. For  those who became disabled after 
1 October 1976, the IP-ABP is a supplementary 
pension (to the AAW). 
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The widow of a civil servant, a former civil servant 
or a retired civil servant is entitled to a widow's 
pension under the ABP (WP-ABP). Her pension 
amounts  to 5/7 of the husband's  pension or the 
pension he could have claimed. If the husband dies 
before he reaches the age of 65 years, the widow's 
pension is calculated on the basis of the term of service 
her husband would have served had he reached the 
age of 65 years. If the widow remarries, the widow's 
pension continues, but now only includes the actual 
term of service. The divorced wife of a deceased civil 
servant can only claim a benefit if the divorce took 
place after 1 October 1971. Her pension is based on 
the term of service up to the day of the divorce. If the 
civil servant had remarried, the second wife's benefit 
was reduced by the amount  the former wife receives. 
A widower's pension (also WP-ABP) is paid if the 
widower's wife was a civil servant, a former civil 
servant or a retired civil servant, and if she was the 
breadwinner and the widower is disabled at least 50%. 
The level of the benefit is determined in the same way 
as for the widow's pension. 
The orphan's  pension is calculated analogously. It 
amounts to 1/7 for semi-orphans and 2/7 of the civil 
servant's pension for full orphans. Orphans '  pensions 
for a widower's children can only be claimed if the 
widower receives a widower's pension. The total 
amount  of the widows', widowers' and orphans '  pen- 
sions is never allowed to exceed the old age pension 
from which it is derived. An AWW or AOW benefit 
is built into the widows', widowers' and orphans '  
pension. 
The social security premiums 
The social security premiums are levied as follows. 
AO W and A WW. These premiums are levied on the 
so-called premium income for the general insurances 
up to 1990. From 1990 on the premium is based on 
taxable income. The premium is a percentage, up to 
the maximum premium income, which from 1990 on 
equals the upper limit of the first income tax group. 
Self-employed persons with an income below a fixed 
amount  receive an integral or a partial reduction. This 
reduction is financed by the government. Until 1 April 
1985, the wife's income was added to her husband's  
income and the AOW/ AWW premium was levied on 
this sum (up to the maximum premium income). If 
the woman's  income was larger than her husband's,  
it was possible to take the woman's  income as the 
starting point. 92 Since then, the AOW/AWW premium 
has been levied on each income separately and the 
maximum premium income also holds for both 
incomes separately. 
Family allowances. All residents who have reached 
the age of 15 are insured under the AKW. In addition 
to this, some groups of non-residents are insured. 
Insured persons have to pay premiums up to the age 
of 65. For employees, the premium was paid by the 
employer up to 1 July 1988, and afterwards the 
premium was financed by public funds. Self-employed 
people have to pay for themselves. Deductions 
similar to the payment for AOW and AWW hold for 
this group. Women who are 45 years or older and who 
do not have children are exempt from premium 
payments on their non-labour income. The employees'  
premiums for the K W L  were paid by their employers 
and for the other group the premiums were financed 
by public funds. The same maximum premium income 
as for the AKW, applied here. The KW premium was 
paid by the employer and amounted to a percentage 
of the daily wage (up to a maximum, which equals 
the maximum premium income for the ZFW). The 
KKZ,  KWR and K T O  benefits were financed by 
public funds. 
AAW.  Premiums had to be paid by all insured 
persons between 15 and 65 up to 1990. For employees, 
premiums were paid by the employer up to 1990. Since 
1990 the AAW premium has to be paid by the 
employee. The employee receives a compensation for 
this amount  from the employer. Up to 1990, the 
premium was a percentage of the so-called premium 
income for the general insurances and from 1990 on 
it has been levied on the taxable income. Analogous 
to the AOW and AWW, a maximum premium income 
exists, which is the same for all general insurances. 
For self-employed persons, the same procedure holds 
as for the AOW, AWW and AKW. 
WAO. WAO premiums are paid by both employer 
and employee. Since 1981 the employee's part has been 
the larger. Before that year employers paid the largest 
part. Premiums are levied proportionally up to a 
maximum income, which is the same as for the ZW. 
A franchise has been free of payment,  since 1977. 93 
Z W  and DSO. The ZW premium is a percentage of 
the wage, up to a maximum (the maximum premium 
income). The premium differs between branches of 
industry and depends on the risk of sickness in the 
various branches. The employer pays the premium, 
but is allowed to deduct half the premium, up to 1% 
~2 Generally, this has fiscal advantages. 
,~3 As a consequence of the introduction of the AAW which governs 
the lower benefit part for employees. 
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at most from the employee's wage. If the employer 
has provided supplementary benefits, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs can agree to deduct more than 1%. The 
DSO is financed by public funds. 
WW. The premium for the unemployment insurance 
for persons belonging to a particular branch of 
industry was fixed for each branch of industry by the 
trade association, which carried the insurance risk. 
Employers and employees each paid half the premium. 
The premium for the general unemployment insurance 
for employees did not differ between sectors, being a 
uniform rate. Both employers and employees had to 
pay a part of the premium. The premium for the 
unemployment due to weather conditions differed 
between branches of industry and was paid by the 
employer. 
WWV. The WWV was financed from public funds 
and thus no premium levies were applicable. 
NWW. Premiums have to be paid by the employer 
and by the employee. The premiums are a percentage 
of the income and are also limited by the premium 
income. 
IOA W, TW and ABW. These benefits are financed 
by public funds. 
ZFW. Until 1989 the ZFW premium for the com- 
pulsory insurance was a percentage of the wage income 
up to the ZFW premium income limit. Since 1989 the 
ZFW premium has been in part a fixed amount per 
household member (for each adult and at most two 
children) and the remaining part is a percentage of 
the wage income up to the ZFW premium income 
limit. Employers and employees each paid half the 
amount until 1989. Since then employers have paid 
about 1.5 times the amount paid by employees. 
The other insurances had fixed premiums. Reduct- 
ions were possible in the voluntary insurance, whereas 
the premium in insurance for the aged also depended 
on income. 
Since 1987 aged persons can also be compulsorily 
insured. They pay a lower premium percentage for 
their AOW benefit. 
A WBZ. Premiums are paid by all insured persons 
aged between 15 and 65. Up to 1990 premiums were 
paid by the employer. Since 1990 the AWBZ premium 
has to be paid by the employee, who receives a 
compensation for this amount from the employer. 
From 1990 on, persons older than 64 also have to pay 
AWBZ premiums, for which their income is adjusted. 
Up to 1990 the premium was a percentage of the 
so-called premium income for the general insurances 
and since 1990 it has been levied on taxable income. 
Analogous to the AOW and AWW, a maximum 
premium income exists, which is the same for all 
general insurances. For self-employed persons, the 
same procedure holds as for the AOW, AWW and 
AKW. 
Private pensions for employees. The Netherlands has 
a large variety of arrangements which offer employees 
the possibility of retiring at a given age. 94 In view of 
the large number of types of arrangements, it is not 
possible to include all arrangements in our model. We 
must therefore limit ourselves to modelling a more or 
less average pension premium. This is necessary 
because the private pension premium also determines 
the income on which the social security premiums are 
levied. We do not consider the benefits, because the 
model does not take account of employees' labour 
mobility. The necessary information on pension claims 
is also lacking at the macro level. The pension 
premium is levied as a percentage of income, up to a 
fixed maximum amount. A franchise has been built in 
to cover AOW claims. 
Pension provisions for civil servants. The pension 
premium is paid by employer and employee. The 
employee pays a fixed percentage of his or her salary 
reduced by a franchise. The premium payment, how- 
ever, has to be at least a certain percentage of salary. 
The Civil Servants Deduction Act (IW). The IW 
became operative in 1981. The IW aims at equal 
treatment of civil servants and private employees for 
social security premiums. Civil servants do not pay 
premiums for the ZW, the WAO, the WW and the 
NWW and their benefits in this field are financed by 
public funds. The IW corrects the civil servants' 
income developments for changes in the premiums for 
these social security provisions in so far as they are 
paid by the employees. The IW is completely included 
in NEDYMAS. 
The implementation of the social security system in 
NED YMAS 
The social security system is almost completely built 
into our model NEDYMAS. The only exceptions are 
listed below. 
For the AOW: 
(i) The exceptions for residents and non-residents, 
as mentioned in note 68. Residents are considered 
to be insured; non-residents are not insured. 
9,, See Elseviers ([-33], p 116). 
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(ii) The provisions for immigrants are only partly 
taken into account. 
(iii) Voluntary premium payments by emigrants are 
not taken into account. 
(iv) The provision, in force up to 1 January 1987, that 
married females who were the breadwinners and 
whose husbands were disabled and had not yet 
reached the age of 65 could claim an AOW benefit 
when they were 65 or older, has not been 
modelled. 
For the AWW: 
(i) A number of very specific provisions for widows 
and orphans living abroad. 
(ii) The settlements for residents and non-residents 
and the provisions for immigrants are treated in 
the same way as for the AOW. 
(iii) The voluntary premium payments by emigrants 
are not taken into account. 
For the family allowances: 
(i) While the Disablement Act is not an element of 
NEDYMAS, it is not possible to determine family 
allowances for people receiving a benefit from the 
Disablement Act. 
(ii) For children in full-time education aged 16 years 
and older, only grants were considered as income 
and this determines the extent to which these 
children are supported by their parents. Up to 
and including 1985, the level of a grant influenced 
claims for family allowances. Therefore, we also 
have to simulate grants. That has been done in 
a rather crude way. It is assumed that a student 
can receive a grant for at most six years. It is also 
assumed that for 60% of the students who can 
claim a grant, the amount of the grant is such 
that these students count for one child for family 
allowances, whereas the other 40% receive a 
limited amount, such that these students can 
claim family allowances for two children (under 
the condition that they are not living with their 
parents). The probability of receiving a scholar- 
ship is determined using NCBS [98,105], the 
inflow into vocational colleges and university 
education, parental income and the number of 
persons in the model population who already 
receive a grant. 
(iii) It is also assumed that children running the 
household have no income, whereas disabled 
children only receive an AAW benefit (from 1 
October 1976 on). 
(iv) The group of non-residents who are insured for 
the AKW, are not included. 
For the AAW: 
(i) The model NEDYMAS does not take into 
account the category of non-resident persons who 
are insured for the AAW and the additional 
provisions. 
(ii) The same applies to the minimum income 
condition for persons who become disabled after 
the age of 17. The impact of this is very limited 
in practice. 
(iii) The individual AAW basis has not been included 
in the model. 
(iv) Inflow into the AAW (and also WAO) goes via 
the ZW for employees and via the DSO for civil 
servants, whereas other people flow in via state 
transitions. The effect of socioeconomic charac- 
teristics on the absence from work for illness 
(at employees and civil servants) has been incor- 
porated by distinguishing duration of sickness 
by level of education (primary school, junior 
(vocational) training, secondary (vocational) 
training, vocational colleges and university), in 
which a correction was made for age and sex 
composition. The figures are derived from Van 
den Brekel ([16], Table 5). These figures have 
not been applied for persons who become disabled 
via state transitions. 
For the WAO: 
(i) NEDYMAS contains all elements with the excep- 
tion of the provisions and the re-examination of 
disabled persons in 1987. 95 
(ii) The effect of socioeconomic characteristics on the 
absence from work for illness has been incorpor- 
ated by distinguishing duration of sickness by 
level of education in the same way as for the 
AAW. 
For the ZW and DSO: 
(i) NEDYMAS assumes that the ZW benefit is 
supplied by the employer up to 100% and that 
the employer also pays the first two days. 96 
(ii) It does not take account of the possibility of a 
part-time resumption of work. 
(iii) No differentiation has been made in premiums 
between various branches of industry. The average 
premium percentage has been used. 
(iv) The inflow into the ZW and DSO is based on 
the number of sicknesses by age, sex and duration 
in firms for which the trade association takes 
care of the ZW benefits. 97 These numbers are 
9~ The impact of the re-examination has been very limited. 
96 Nowadays, this holds for about 90% of all employees. 
97 Private industrial executive body for social insurance in the 
Netherlands: see NCBS [100]. 
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transformed into the probability of becoming ill 
for i days (i = 1,2 . . . . .  365). 
(v) The effect of socioeconomic characteristics on the 
absence from work for illness has again been 
incorporated by distinguishing duration of sick- 
ness by level of education: see Van den Brekel 
([16], Table 5). 
(vi) It is assumed that a person only receives a ZW 
or DSO benefit once a year. 
For the WW: 
(i) NEDYMAS does not distinguish between the 
unemployment insurance for persons belonging 
to a branch of industry and the general unemploy- 
ment insurance for employees. The conditions 
for a benefit and the level of the benefit do not 
differ. The difference is in the premium payment. 
However, in NEDYMAS the branch of occupa- 
tion is not modelled. We therefore use an average 
premium percentage for the first type of insurance. 
(ii) Unemployment due to weather conditions has 
not been incorporated, because we do not have 
sufficient data. 
(iii) The settlement for supplementary payments has 
not been incorporated. 
(iv) The inflow into and the outflow out of the state 
unemployed is simulated by the submodule for 
state transitions. It is assumed that an individual 
loses his job once a year at most. 
For the WWV: 
(i) NEDYMAS contains all elements with the excep- 
tion of the settlement for supplementary payments 
and the possibility of partial unemployment in 
combination with being employed for part of the 
time. 
For  the NWW: 
(i) All elements have been incorporated in 
NEDYMAS, with the exception of the voluntary 
insurance and the possibility of part-time un- 
employment in combination with a part-time job. 
On the other hand, the claims for an NWW 
benefit for partly disabled persons are included 
in the model. 
(ii) Inflow into and outflow out of the state un- 
employed takes place in the submodule for state 
transitions. 
For  the IOAW and TW: 
(i) The model does not generate own labour income 
for unemployed and disabled persons. The ex- 
emption has therefore not been modelled. 
For the ABW: 
(i) NEDYMAS does not distinguish between the 
different National Group Regulations. 
(ii) The Incidental Assistance and the assistance for 
persons not living at home (insofar as it exceeds 
the regular benefit) are included in the latest 
version of NEDYMAS. 
(iii) For each individual we investigated each year 
whether he or she had an income below the social 
minimum. If this is the case, then it is assumed 
that the person can claim an ABW benefit. The 
reduction for single persons living together in one 
household is not considered. 
(iv) No reductions are made for the presence of 
property, since NEDYMAS does not know each 
individual's property. 
For the ZFW and AWBZ: 
(i) A description of the implementation of medical 
consumption has been given in Nelissen [120]. 
For the WRO: 
(i) The WRO has been incorporated in NEDYMAS 
with the exception of the reduction of the benefit 
in the case of new additional income. The model 
does not generate this kind of income. 
(ii) It is assumed that civil servants with a term 
of service which is three years or less receive 
a short-term benefit under the Civil Servants 
Unemployment Benefit Provision 1966, that 
those with a term of service between three to six 
years receive a long benefit under this Provision 
and that those with a term of service which 
exceeds six years receive a benefit under the 
Decree Civil Servants Unemployment Benefits 
1959. 
For the private pensions for employees: 
(i) See above under the premium payments. 
For the pension provisions for civil servants: 
(i) With the exclusion of the widows' pension for 
divorced women, the pension provisions for civil 
servants have been completely incorporated to 
NEDYMAS. 
Future premiums and benefits 
Insofar as benefits are not based on (former) income, 
we assume that the present legal regulations do not 
change. The gross-gross linking determines the gross 
minimum wage. It is assumed that the gross minimum 
wage changes according to the average wage. The net 
minimum wage is subsequently determined by reduc- 
ing the gross minimum wage by the premiums for the 
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Table 8. Percentage rise for administration expenses and mutual 
payments. 






ZW ! 4.04 
Source: Calculated from NCBS [118]. 
different general and employee insurances and the 
taxes. This net minimum wage is then translated into 
gross benefits. For example, for the AOW this means 
that the net amount  is raised by the payable tax plus 
a part in the reimbursement of the costs of the health 
insurance. 98 
Past premium percentages are known from NCBS 
[99]. For the future, we have endogenized the 
premium percentages. The sum of the benefits is 
determined by the model. Dividing this sum for each 
of the social insurances plus a rise for administration 
expenses and mutual payments,  by the sum of the 
concerning premium income, gives us the premium 
percentage. The rise for administration expenses and 
mutual payments between the several social insurances 
is based on the 1988 figures. These can be found in 
Table 8. 
In this, we assumed that the maximum premium 
income and other income limits for the different 
insurances, the franchise for the WAO and the gross 
minimum wage change according to the average 
wages. This implies that we assume that the minimum 
wage and the benefits are indexed in the long run. It 
is also assumed that the state contribution does not 
change and that the division of the premiums between 
employers and employees remains unchanged. The 
premiums for the Z F W  and AWBZ are held constant 
at the 1990 level. 
Simulation results 
In this section we will give some simulation results 
and compare them, if possible, with observations from 
official statistical sources. All simulations start in 1947. 
The initial population numbers only 10000 persons. 
The standard deviations are based on 10 repeats with 
different numbers for the random generator. The 
figures that refer to amounts (which are all in Dutch 
guilders) are nominal, and we assume that no inflation 
is present from 1992. 
Table 9 gives the development in wage income for 
98 See Huijser and Van Loo ([72], pp 52-55). 




1967 52.0 52.9 1.2 
1970 71.3 72.7 1.2 
1975 126.1 122.2 1.5 
1983 203.5 200.0 2.3 
1985 216.9 210.2 3.6 
1989 238.8 3.9 
2000 306.2 3.0 
2010 384.2 3.9 
2020 481.4 3.8 







persons aged 15 to 65. We can see that the wage in- 
come is simulated very well. The simulated wage 
income deviates less than 3.1% from actual wage 
income. Up to about  1975 the model overestimates 
wage income somewhat and from 1975 on we find an 
underestimation. One explanation for this under- 
reporting is that the model does not take account of 
the reported wage income of students who study full 
time and work part time. Real national wage income 
will double between 1989 and about 2020 given the 
model assumptions (see the section on wage income 
in particular). 
The upper panel of Table 10 contains the results 
for the 1947 91 simulation for disabled persons. The 
inflow goes via the ZW for employees and the DSO 
for civil servants, whereas the outflow has been 
determined using the 1977 Labour Force Survey 
results, which also determine the inflow of other 
persons. The resulting outflow probabilities have 
been used throughout the whole simulation period. 
The model simulates the number of disabled em- 
ployees 11° very well for the period 1947-75. The 
simulated number of disabled male employees is only 
4% larger than the actual number, whereas the 
simulated number of disabled female employees is 
1.2% below the actual number;  and this after a 
simulation period of 28 years. Between 1975 and 1983 
the simulation model results in a male inflow which 
is too large, and a female inflow which is too small. 
This is compensated in the other direction between 
1983 and 1989, so that the simulated numbers in the 
latter year are again very close to the actual numbers. 
The deviations now amount  to - 4 . 6 %  and - 3 . 7 %  
for men and women respectively. We also see that the 
actual number is within the 95% confidence interval 
for all years during the simulation period. The number 
of disabled female former civil servants is always 
underestimated, but the deviation with respect to the 
actual number  declines proportionally. For  1989 we 
s e e  that the actual number is within the 95% 
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Table 10. Disabled persons: simulated and actual numbers. 
Employees 
Simulation 

















283.4 16.1 - 18.9 
430.1 9.3 40.0 33.3 
415.3 14.7 50.9 52.8 
75.5 8.7 - 2.9 
112.0 10.1 14.3 8.8 






































confidence interval. The male number of disabled 
former civil servants is close to the actual number in 
1989 (+  3.7 %), but is also underestimated in the past. 
Finally, the upper panel shows the results for the 
remaining category of disabled persons (such as early 
handicapped persons and the former self-employed). 
The 1989 numbers again are reasonably good in view 
of the limited numbers involved. 
Table 10 also shows the simulated number of 
disabled former employees for the period 1992-2030. 
On the basis of the model assumptions, the number 
of male disabled ex-employees will decline gradually, 
but the decrease is very limited. On the other hand 
the model predicts an increase of the female number 
by about 50% between 1992 and 2015, whereafter the 
number stabilizes. 
Next, we show some results with respect to the social 
security module. These simulation results are more or 
less crucial. The benefits and contributions are affected 
by the quality of the simulations of demography, the 
educational attainment, socioeconomic transitions 
and wage income. For the period up to 1992 we show 
the benefits for several schemes, whereas from 1992 
we give the development in the contribution rate. This 
has been done, because the premium percentages are 
endogenized since then and consequently also deter- 
mined by the simulation performance of the model 
with respect to the benefit side of the social security 
module. 
We start with the results for the public pensions 
(AOW). These are given in Table 11. The AOW 
benefits are underestimated by the model, especially 
in the 1960s and 1970s. This is largely due to the fact 
that we do not take account of the benefits for 
non-residents (just as for the premium payments by 
non-residents) and provisions for immigrants are only 
partly taken into account. The simulations for 1989 
and 1991 are very good from this point of view. This 
is confirmed by the simulated AOW premium per- 
centage for 1992 which is very nearly the same as the 
actual in that year (14.35%). The greying of the Dutch 
population will result in a large increase of the AOW 
premium percentage, as is confirmed by the simula- 
tions in the lower panel of Table 11. The simulated 
contribution rate increases from 14.33% in 1992 to 
17.54% in 2010 to over 25% in 2030. These per- 
centages are in line with other Dutch forecasts (see eg 
Van den Bosch et al [14], p 1056). 
The results for the public widowers' and orphans'  













Actual .u o 
3.62 3.10 0.16 
5.24 4.38 0.21 
11.60 9.51 0.49 
21.70 19.62 0.59 
25.43 24.09 0.72 
30.75 29.42 0.21 
Premium percentage 
Simulation 
Actual p o 
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Table 12. Simulated AWW benefits (billion Dutch guilders). 
Simulation 
Actual ~t 
1967 0.52 0.51 0,02 
1970 0.73 0.72 0.05 
1975 1.55 1.66 0.06 
1983 2.62 3.01 0.03 
1989 3.03 3.55 0.13 




1992 1,15 1.27 0.09 
2000 1.21 0.07 
2010 1.29 0.07 
2020 1.16 0.11 
2030 1.13 0.13 
Table 14. Simulated ZW benefits (billion Dutch guilders). 
Simulation 
Actual p a 
1967 1.08 1.19 0,01 
1970 2.13 1.96 0,09 
1975 4.49 4.90 0.23 
1983 6.24 6.26 0,11 
1989 8.15 7.79 (I.29 
1991 10.90 10.90 0.09 
Premium percentage 
Simulation 
Actual p ~7 
1992 4.00 4.22 0.19 
2000 4.07 0.19 
2010 3.90 0.21 
2020 3.96 0.25 
2030 3,95 0.15 
Only employers' part. 
pensions  scheme ( A W W )  are  shown in Table  12. The  
to ta l  benefits are s imula ted  very well in the 1950s and 
1960s. However ,  we find an overes t imat ion  of the 
A W W  benefits for the 1980s and to a lesser extent  for 
the 1990s. This is due to the overes t imat ion  of 
widowed  persons  by the mode l  since a b o u t  1975 (see 
Nelissen [119],  Table  12). The  s imula ted  benefits also 
fit very well for the 1980s and 1990s if we correct  for 
the la t te r  overes t imat ion  in the number  of  widowed  
persons.  F o r  the future, we find a slight decrease for 
the A W W  premium percentage  from a b o u t  2010. 
The s imula t ion  results for the publ ic  d isabi l i ty  
scheme (AAW)  are  sa t i s fac tory:  see Table  13. The  
years 1983 and 1989 show a small  overes t imat ion  of  
the A A W  benefits,  whereas  we find a small  under-  
es t imat ion  in 1991 and  1992. 
The overes t imat ion  of the A A W  benefits in the 1980s 
is largely due to the lack of  the m i n i m u m  income 
cond i t ion  for persons o lder  than  17 years of age in 
o rde r  to claim a benefit.  However ,  the consequences  
of the la t ter  seem to be very small .  The under-  
Table 13, Simulated AAW benefits (billion Dutch guilders). 
Simulation 
Actual # a 
1983 8.87 9.14 0.20 
1989 11.04 11.46 0.52 




1992 2.75 2.46 0.11 
2000 2.66 0.07 
2010 2.88 0.11 
2020 2.68 0.06 
2030 2.57 0.12 
es t imat ion  since 1989 is the result  of the fact that  the 
mic ros imula t ion  model  does not  take account  of  the 
benefits a iming to create  provis ions  for d isabled  
persons  which serve for main tenance ,  recupera t ion  
from or  benefit for disabi l i ty ,  or  for improvemen t  in 
living condi t ions .  
L ook ing  at the future, we see that  the A A W  
premium percentage  will still increase until  abou t  
2010, but  thereafter  it declines slowly. 
The benefits for the sickness insurances  (ZW) are 
very good ,  as Table  14 shows. The s imula ted  Z W  
benefits for the year  1991 fit comple te ly  with the ac tual  
figures. Since we assume that  sickness du ra t i on  does 
not  change in the future, the p remium percentage  
hard ly  changes after 1992. The changes that  do  occur  
are mainly  due to changes in the d e m o g r a p h i c  
s t ructure  of the work ing  popu la t ion .  
The s imula t ion  results for the W A O  are given in 
Table  15. Genera l ly ,  the results are sat isfactory.  













Actual /t a 
0.41 0.39 0.09 
1.67 1.62 0.23 
5.42 6.57 0.35 
7.32 7.69 0.32 
6.85 7.60 0.39 
8.00 8.15 0.11 
Premium percentage 
Simulation 
Actual /~ a 
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Table 16. Simulated WW benefits (billion Dutch guilders). 
Simulation 
Actual /~ a 
1967 0.34 0.37 0.02 
1970 0.28 0.60 0.06 
1975 1.55 1.78 0.08 
1983 3.53 3.20 0.12 
1989 3.99 3.90 0.21 
1991 4.43 3.96 0.23 
Premium percentage 
Simulation 
Actual p a 
1992 2.40 2.46 0.27 
2000 2.26 0.21 
2010 1.66 0.16 
2020 1.24 0.17 
2030 1.40 0.18 
However, we find a large overestimation of the WAO 
benefits for the year 1975 and to a lesser degree for the 
year 1989, although the actual figure for the latter year 
is within the 95 % confidence interval of the simulation. 
It is not known what factor(s) cause(s) the over- 
estimation. For  the future a stabilization of the 
premium percentage can be expected on the basis of 
the model assumptions. 
The next insurance to be considered is the (N)WW, 
whose results are shown in Table 16. The results are 
reasonably good, with the exception of those for the 
year 1970. In 1970, NEDYMAS overestimates the 
actual WW benefits by more than 100%. An explana- 
tion as regards content is not available. Possibly, the 
low numbers involved in unemployment in combina- 
tion with the small size of the initial simulation 
population (10000 persons) play a part. 
For  the future the model results in a WW premium 
percentage that declines to about 1.4 in the long run. 
The decrease in the premium percentage follows from 
the decline in the number of unemployed persons in 
the model, which is based on the assumptions in 
Departementale Werkgroep SZW [28]. 
Finally we turn to comparing the simulated benefits 
from the Civil Servants Pensions Fund (ABP) with the 
actual. The figures also include the benefits for some 
other groups of civil servants, ie those who belong to 
the Railwaymen Pensions Fund (Spoorwegpensioen- 
fonds) and those who can claim a benefit from the 
Pensions Provision for Military Men (Voorziening in 
het eigen pensioen van militairen). This is the subject 
of Table 17. Since our simulation starts in the year 
1947, the model is not able to take account of pensions 
claims that were built up before that year. This implies 
that NEDYMAS covers the whole range of benefits 
at first in 1987, the year in which the first generation 
Table 17. Simulated ABP benefits (billion Dutch guilders). 
Simulation 
Actual p o 
1967 1.21 0.56 0.10 
1970 1.73 1.09 0.16 
1975 3.98 4.14 0.56 
1983 7.82 7.99 0.68 
1989 10.79 10.51 0.50 
1991 - 10.62 0.24 
(those who were 25 - the entrance age of the ABP - 
in 1947) which is completely covered, can claim an 
old age pension. From that point of view, the 
simulated benefits have to be below the actual up to 
1987. This applies to the years 1967 and 1970, but for 
the year 1975 we find an overestimation of the ABP 
benefits, but the standard deviation is rather large. 
Our conclusion here is also that the model simulates 
the benefits very well. Because the ABP is based on 
capital funding, we do not give the development of 
the premium percentage in the future. In practice, this 
is influenced by political decisions. 
Conclusions 
In this paper several elements of the dynamic cross- 
sectional microsimulation model NEDYMAS are 
presented: the labour market  module, the income 
formation module, the tax module and the social 
security module. The model has been developed in 
order to study long-term developments, particularly 
in the field of social security schemes. For that goal it 
is necessary to model a large number  of socioeconomic 
characteristics at the micro level. These are shown in 
Appendix 1. 
The quality of the model has been shown by some 
simulations, that are run on the basis of a database 
constructed for the year 1947 (see Nelissen [119]). 
This database has been adjusted each year by the simu- 
lation model. With the exception of the unemployment 
figures, no corrections were applied by the resulting 
database. This unemployment correction is necessary 
because of the lack of a macromodel  around the 
micromodel. 
From the simulation results it is clear that the model 
is able to reconstruct the long-term socioeconomic 
development at the micro level satisfactorily and 
consequently to simulate the social security benefits 
very well. This in spite of the fact that behaviour 
equations are only applied on a limited scale. These 
concern the labour force participation and income 
dynamics. Behavioural aspects are also used (but have 
been limited to elements of it) in the transitions into 
(un)employment, sickness and disability. 
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Appendix 1 
Attributes used in NEDYMAS 
001 identification 
002 sex 
003 marital status 
004 year of birth 
005 year of death 
006 mother 
007 father 
008 year of leaving parental home 
009 degree of urbanization 
010 level of education 
011 level of partner's education 
012 end of education 
013 part-time education 
014 year of emigration 




019 children with former partner 
020 year of cohabitation 
021 year of marriage 
022 year of divorce 
023 year of widowhood 
025 partner 
026 former partner 
027 old people's home 
028- children 
047 
048- children with former partner 
067 
Sequence number of individual generated 
Male, female 
0=unmarr ied  and non-cohabiting, l =married,  2=divorced and non- 
cohabiting, 3=widowed and non-cohabiting, 4=ummarr ied  and cohabiting, 
5=divorced and cohabiting, 6=widowed and cohabiting 
Year of birth of the individual 
Year in which the individual died 
Pointer to the mother 
Pointer to the father 
Year in which the individual left parental home or both parents died 
0 = unknown, 1 = place of residence with fewer than 50 000 inhabitants (in 1982), 
2=50000 up to 400000 inhabitants, 3=400000 inhabitants or more 
See Nelissen ([122], Chapter 4, Table 4.1) 
See Nelissen ([122], Chapter 4, Table 4.1) 
Year in which the education process is left 
Boolean for being in part-time (true) or full-time (false) education 
Year in which the individual emigrates 
Year in which the individual immigrates 
Boolean indicating whether a married or cohabiting man emigrates with (false) 
or without (true) his partner 
Number of siblings 
Number of children, including partner's children born before the current marriage 
or cohabitation and excluding children of whom a former partner has been 
granted custody 
Number of children of whom a former partner has been granted custody 
Year in which the cohabitation started 
Year in which the marriage was contracted 
Year in which both partners divorced or dehabitated 
Year in which the partner died 
Pointer for the partner 
Pointer for the former partner 
Boolean that is true if a person lives in an old people's home, otherwise false 
Pointers to the children, with the exclusion of children of whom a former partner 
has been granted custody 
Pointers to the children of whom a former partner has been granted custody, 
up to the age of 22 years. The last two pointers are used as pointers to the 
mother and father, respectively, if the mother or father has died or could claim 
benefits from the Civil Servants Pension Fund (ABP) 
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068 economic activity 
069 percentile 
070 labour force participation 
071 year of unemployment 
072 month of unemployment 
073 year of employment 
074 month of employment 
075 children 
076 aow years 







084 prinkwv 1 
085 benefit basis 
086 taxable income 
087 wealth 
088 wealth abw 
089 child allowance 
090 benefit abw 
091 labour I-6] 
092 labour [5] 
093 labour [4] 
094 labour I-3"] 
095 labour [-2] 
096 labour [1] 
097 upcs 
098 upcs 1 
099 duration upcs 
100 type upcs 
101 upcs amount 
102 midsum l-2] 
103 midsum I-1] 
104 term of office abp 
105 term of office abp 1 
106 old age abp 
107 disability abp 
108 widowhood abp 
109 wage 
110 net wage rate 
111 gross income 
112 net income 
113 scholarship 
Labour market, income formation and social security in NED YMAS: J.H.M. Nelissen 
1 = employee, 2 = self-employed, 3 = retired, 4 = unemployed, but not previously 
an employee or a civil servant, 5=civil servant, 6=unemployed employee, 
7 = unemployed civil servant, 8 = conscript, 9 = disabled employee, 10 = disabled 
civil servant, 11 =disabled, not being 9 or 10, 12=student, 13=housewife or 
househusband, 14 = unemployed, before disabled employee, 15 = unemployed, 
before disabled civil servant, 16 = unemployed, before disabled, not being 14 or 15 
The percentile of the income distribution to which the individual belongs 
The proportion of the current labour time; 0 = participation unemployed or not 
available for the labour market; l=fu l l  time; between 0 and 1 part time 
Year in which a person became unemployed 
Month in which a person became unemployed 
Year in which a person entered economic activity working for the last time 
Month in which a person entered economic activity working for the last time 
Number of children counting for the child allowance acts 
Number of years insured for the AOW 
Boolean, which is true if a person is insured voluntarily for the AOW (emigrants 
only) 
Boolean, true if a person receives an ABW benefit in the current year 
Boolean, true if a person can claim an RWW benefit 
Boolean, true if a person can claim an IOAW benefit 
1 = high basis, 2 = low basis 
Income concept, on the basis of which the premiums for the AOW, AWW, 
AKW, AWBZ and AAW are determined 
Income concept, on the basis of which the premiums for ZFW, ZW, WAO, WW 
and NWW are calculated 
Income concept, on the basis of which the premiums for ZFW are calculated, 
when a person is retired 




Household wealth in accordance with ABW definition 
The amount of child allowances received 
The amount of ABW benefits received 
The number of months employed this year 
The number of months employed last year 
The number of months employed two years ago 
The number of months employed three years ago 
The number of months employed four years ago 
The number of months employed five years ago 
Unemployment pay for civil servants; 0 = n o  rights, - l = c l a i m  for a short 
benefit, + 1 = claim for other type 
Boolean, which is true if a person can claim a upcs in the current year 
Number of months a civil servant can claim unemployment pay 
Type of upcs; 1 =Rijkswachtgeldbesluit 1959, 2=Uitkeringsregeling 1966, 
3 =other 
Amount received from unemployment pay for civil servants 
Income in the last but one year as civil servant, relevant to ABP benefits 
Income in the last year as civil servant, relevant to ABP benefits 
The term of office built up for the ABP pensions 
The term of office built up for the ABP pensions, relating to the change on 
1 October 1986 
Amount received from ABP old age pension 
Amount received from ABP disablement benefit 
Amount received from ABP widowhood and orphan benefit 
Before-tax labour income 
After-tax labour income per hour 
Wage plus benefits 
After-tax income in the current year 
Boolean, which is true if a person receives a scholarship 
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114 non-wage income 
115 payment  aow 
I 16 benefit aow 
1 ! 7 extra al lowance aow 
118 payment  aww 
119 benefit aww 
120 payment  akwl  
121 payment  akw2 
122 payment  akw3 
123 benefit akw 
124 year of d isablement  
125 percentage disabled 
126 disabled 
127 benefit aaw 
128 benefit aawl  
129 payment  aawl  
130 payment  aaw2 
131 benefit wao 
132 payment  waol  
133 payment  wao2 
134 basis wao 
135 benefit dso 
136 payment  dso 
137 benefit zw 
138 payment  zwl 
139 payment  zw2 
140 mon ths  ww 
141 ww 
142 benefit ww 
143 payment  wwl 
144 payment  ww2 
145 wwv 
146 benefit wwv 
147 year rww 
148 mon th  rww 
149 year ioaw 
150 m o n t h  ioaw 
151 benefit ioaw 
152 tw 
153 dura t ion  tw 
154 basis tw 
155 benefit tw 
156 nww high 
157 nww 
158 nww cont inued  
159 zfw 
160 payment  zfwl 
161 payment  zfw2 
162 payment  awbzl  
163 payment  awbz2 
164 tax 
165 tax group 
166 tax transfer 
The amoun t  of non-wage income received 
The a m o u n t  paid for A O W  
The a m o u n t  received from A O W  
The a m o u n t  received from the A O W  as an extra allowance, if par tner  is younger  
than 65 years and has a limited income 
The a m o u n t  paid for the A W W  
The a m o u n t  received from the A W W  
The a m o u n t  paid for child allowances (self-employed only) 
The a m o u n t  employer  pays for child allowances (employees onlyt  
The a m o u n t  the state, as employer,  implicitly pays for child allowances (civil 
servants only) 
The amoun t  received from child allowances 
Year in which a person became disabled 
The percentage of being disabled 
Boolean,  which is true if a person is disabled 
The a m o u n t  received from the AAW (lifetime) 
The amoun t  received from the AAW in the current  year 
The a m o u n t  paid for the AAW (self-employed only) 
The a m o u n t  the employer  pays for the AAW (employees only) 
The a m o u n t  received from the W A O  
The a m o u n t  paid for the W A O  
The a m o u n t  the employer  pays for the W A O  (employees only) 
The a m o u n t  on which the W A O  benefit is based 
The a m o u n t  received as sickness benefits from the state (civil servants only) 
The a m o u n t  the state, as employer,  pays for sickness insurance (civil servants 
only) 
The a m o u n t  received from the Z W  
The a m o u n t  paid for the Z W  
The a m o u n t  an employer  pays for the Z W  (employees only) 
N u m b e r  of mon ths  a person received a W W  benefit 
Boolean,  which is true if a person can claim a (N)WW benefit 
The a m o u n t  received from the (N)WW 
The a m o u n t  paid for the (NJWW 
The a m o u n t  the employer  pays for the (N)WW (employees only) 
The n u m b e r  of mon ths  of receipt of a W W V  benefit 
The a m o u n t  received from the W W V  
Year in which a person starts receiving a new R W W  benefit 
M o n t h  in which a person starts receiving a new R W W  benefit 
Year in which a person starts receiving a new I O A W  benefit 
M o n t h  in which a person starts receiving a new I O A W  benefit 
The a m o u n t  received from the I O A W  
Boolean,  which is true if a person can claim a T W  benefit 
The n u m b e r  of m o n t h s  in the current  year, for which claim a T W  benefit can 
be claimed 
The income which serves as a start ing point  for the TW claim 
The a m o u n t  received from the T W  
Boolean,  which is true for individuals who can claim a benefit, tha t  exceeds 70% 
of the last salary, as a consequence of the temporary  provisions at the t ime of 
in t roduct ion  of the N W W  
The n u m b e r  of mon ths  an  N W W  benefit can be claimed 
The n u m b e r  of mon ths  an N W W  Vervolgui tker ing benefit can be claimed 
Boolean,  which is true if a person is compulsori ly  insured for the Z F W  
The a m o u n t  paid for the Z F W  
The a m o u n t  the employer  pays for the Z F W  (employees only) 
The a m o u n t  paid for the A W B Z  (self-employed only) 
The a m o u n t  an employer  pays for the A W B Z  (employees only) 
The tax a m o u n t  paid in the current  year 
The tax group to which a person belongs 
Income free of tax, which is not  earned by the individual  in quest ion and which 
is added to the par tner ' s  income free of tax 
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167 social group 
168 epsilon 
169 aow(t) 
170 lifetime wages 
171 lifetime taxes 
172 distance 
173 time 
174 health insurance 
175 labour income logical 
176 capital income logical 
177 pension income logical 
178 other social security income 
logical 
179 grant income logical 
180 alimony logical 
181 dgvp/iza/izr 
182 payment iza.. 1 
183 payment iza..2 
184 private health insurance 
185 type of zfw insurance if not 
compulsorily 
186 premium zfw aged 
187 premium zfw voluntary 
188 premium private health 
insurances 
189 employers' contribution 
190 entrance nursing home 
191 entrance institution for the 
mentally disabled 
192 entrance psychiatric hospital 
193 entrance other institution 
194 medical consumption awbz 
195 medical consumption z fw-  
compulsory 
196 medical consumption z fw-  
voluntary 
197 medical consumption z fw-  
aged 
198 medical consumption 
iza/izr/dgvp 
199 medical consumption private 
insurances 
200 rate home for the aged 
201 lifetime abw-institution 
202 own contribution awbz 
203 benefit kwl/kbwl/kkz 
204 payment kwl/kbwl 
Labour market, income formation and social security in NED YMAS." J.H.M. Nelissen 
The social group a person belongs to; this group is derived from the parents' 
level of education 
The draw out of the normal distribution to generate income mobility 
The now amount received in the current year 
The sum of lifetime wages 
The sum of lifetime taxes 
Distance (in km) to nearest general or university hospital 
Total time needed for a visit to a general practitioner 
Health insurance class: 1 =class III; 2=class liB; 3 =class IIA 
Yes/no labour income in current year 
Yes/no capital income in current year 
Yes/no pension income in current year 
Yes/no other social security income in current year 
Yes/no grant income in current year 
Yes/no alimony in current year 
Logical for being insured under DGVP/IZA/IZR 
The amount a civil servant pays for the DGVP/IZA/IZR 
The amount an employer pays for the DGVP/IZA/IZR (employees only) 
Logical for being privately insured 
1 = voluntarily insured under the ZFW; 2 = ZFW insurance for the insured aged; 
3 = not insured under the ZFW 
Premium payments for the ZFW insurance for the aged 
Premium payments for the voluntary ZFW insurance 
Premium payments for private health insurances 
Employers' contribution for health insurance costs for persons who do not fall 
under the compulsory ZFW or DGVP/IZA/IZR 
Date at which a person entered a nursing home 
Date at which a person entered an institution for the mentally disabled 
Date at which a person entered a psychiatric hospital 
Date at which a person entered another institution 
Medical consumption reimbursed by the AWBZ 
Medical consumption reimbursed by the compulsory ZFW 
Medical consumption reimbursed by the voluntary ZFW 
Medical consumption reimbused by the ZFW for the aged 
Medical consumption reimbursed by the IZA, IZR or DGVP 
Medical consumption reimbursed by private health insurances 
Rates holding for homes for the aged (1988 prices) 
Lifetime payments for persons living in institutions by the ABW 
Own contributions for the use of AWBZ facilities 
Lifetime benefits from KWL/KBWL/KKZ 
Lifetime payments for KWL/KWBL 
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Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet/General Disablement Benefits Act 
Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds/Civil Servants Pensions Fund 
Algemene Bijstandswet/General Social Assistance Act 
Algemene Kinderbijslagwet/General Family Allowances Act 
Algemene Ouderdomswet/General Old Age Pensions Act 
Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten/General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act 
Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet/General Widows and Orphans Pensions Act 
Dienst Geneeskundige Verzorging Politie/Health Cost Provision for Policemen 
Doorbetaling Overheidspersoneel ingeval van ziekte/Sickness Payments for Civil Servants 
Inkomensvoorziening voor Oudere en Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikte Werkloze Werknemers/Provision for 
Older and Partly Disabled Unemployed Employees 
Invaliditeitspensioen ingevolge het ABP/Disability Pension under the ABP 
Inhoudingswet Ambtenaren/Civil Servants Deduction Act 
lnstituut Ziektekostenvoorziening Ambtenaren/Health Costs Provision for Civil Servants 
Interprovinciale Ziektekosten Regelingen/Health costs Provision for Provincial Officials 
Kinderbijslagwet Kleine Zelfstandigen/Self-Employed Persons Family Allowances Act 
Kindertoelage Overheidspersoneel/Civil Servants Family Allowances Provision 
Kinderbijslagwet/Family Allowances Act 
Kinderbijslagwet voor Loontrekkenden/Wage-Earners Family Allowances Act 
Kinderbijslagwet voor Rentetrekkers/Benefit Receiving Persons Family Allowances Act 
Nieuwe Werkloosheidswet/New Unemployment Insurance Act 
Ouderdomspensioen ingevolge het ABP/OId Age Pension under the ABP 
Toeslagenwet/Supplementary Benefits Act 
Wet Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering/Disablement Insurance Act 
Weduwen-, weduwnaars- en wezenpensioen ingevolge bet ABP/Widows, Widowers and Orphans Pension 
under the ABP 
Werknemerspensioenen in private sector/Private Pensions for Employees 
Wachtgeldregeling Overheidspersoneel/Civil Servants Unemployment Benefit 
Werkloosheidswet/Unemployment Insurance Act 
Wet Werkloc~sheidsvoorziening/Unemployment Provisions Act 
Ziekenfondsbesluit/Decree Health Insurance Fund 
Ziekenfondswet/Health Insurance Fund Act 
Ziektewet/Sickness Benefit Act 
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